Oh, I wasnt arguing that this isnt an issue. The opposite in fact. I was documenting why it is an issue ie, that a ca can't argue this isnt a compliance concern. It comes up a lot but I dont remember seeing it here.
From: Ryan Sleevi Sent: Thursday, August 29, 11:38 AM Subject: Re: DigiCert OCSP services returns 1 byte To: Jeremy Rowley Cc: Curt Spann, mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 1:15 PM Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy <email@example.com<mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org>> wrote: Thanks for posting this Curt. We investigated and posted an incident report on Bugzilla. The root cause was related to pre-certs and an error in generating certificates for them. We're fixing the issue (should be done shortly). I figured it'd be good to document here why pre-certs fall under the requirement so there's no confusion for other CAs. Oh, Jeremy, you were going so well on the bug, but now you've activated my trap card (since you love the memes :) ) It's been repeatedly documented every time a CA tries to make this argument. Would you suggest we remove that from the BRs? I'm wholly supportive of this, since it's known I was not a fan of adding it to the BRs for precisely this sort of creative interpretation. I believe you're now the ... fourth... CA that's tried to skate on this? Multiple root programs have clarified: The existence of a pre-certificate is seen as a binding committment, for purposes of policy, by that CA, that it will or has issued an equivalent certificate. 1) Has DigiCert reviewed the existing incident reports from other CAs? 2) What process does DigiCert have to review all compliance issues, regardless of the CA, so that it can examine its own systems for similar issues or be aware of relevant discussions and/or ambiguities? (And, yes, it's a trap) _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list email@example.com https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy