On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 1:52 PM Tim Hollebeek via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> I think that's fine as Mozilla and/or the CABF can and should override
> RFCs when it makes sense to do so, but I think it would also be helpful in
> the long term to fix the discrepancy, especially as CT is likely to be used
> in more certificate ecosystems in the future.

Isn't the core tenet that the IETF does not define policy? This seems very
well rooted in policy, as you note.

The question does not seem to be about whether or not
precertificates-are-certificates (and, in a -bis world, they're clearly a
SignedData-thing-that-isn't), but what constitutes the act of issuance: is
it signing a thing (whether a TBSCertificate or something other, like a
precertificate under 6962 or 6962-bis)? Is it reserving the serial number
and assigning it in the system?

In any event, if/when CT is used in other systems, they'll be using
different CT logs, so they'll really be entirely different ecosystems. It
seems that the policy management authority (i.e. the equivalent to
browsers, in the Web PKI) for those ecosystems can provide clarity, and it
further emphasizes why a single CA certificate should not participate in
multiple PMAs, to reduce the risk of and avoid conflicts and/or
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