Hi Jeremy, Can you clarify why you believe the signing key cannot be easily used? Is there a cryptographic limitation in what was disclosed?
Also, do you have plans for a more formal post-mortem? Since vulnerability management is usually an organization-wide process, it would be useful to understand why it failed here, in the event it could have carried over to other DigiCert infrastructure. Thanks, Ian Carroll On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 4:19 PM Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy < [email protected]> wrote: > Hey all, > > The key used to sign SCTs for the CT2 log was compromised yesterday at 7pm > through the Salt root bug. The remaining logs remain uncompromised and run > on separate infrastructure. We discovered the compromise today and are > working to turn that log into read only mode so that no new SCTs are > issued. We doubt the key was used to sign anything as you'd need to know > the CT build to do so. However, as a precaution, we ask that you consider > all SCTs invalid if the SCT was issued from CT2 after 7pm MST on May 2nd . > Please let me know what questions you have. > > Jeremy > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
