All,

This is a new thread that I'm branching off of the discussion that started
here -
https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/lAu1_S48RAA/m/K8NsiO-VCQAJ
.
Additional background for this new discussion can also be found here:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1741777#c2.

The issue is whether it is appropriate to replace a root CA certificate
(missing the digitalSignature key usage bit) with another root CA
certificate (same key pair) that has the digitalSignature key usage bit set.

Section 4.2.1.3 of RFC 5280
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3> says,

      The digitalSignature bit is asserted when the subject public key
      is used for verifying digital signatures, other than signatures on
      certificates (bit 5) and CRLs (bit 6), ....

(Using a CA with the digitalSignature key usage bit set to sign OCSP
responses is discussed somewhat here:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/pkix/0eZNhjidM89nB8vBbb_W7XL-QV8/.)

Thanks,

Ben

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