All, This is a new thread that I'm branching off of the discussion that started here - https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/lAu1_S48RAA/m/K8NsiO-VCQAJ . Additional background for this new discussion can also be found here: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1741777#c2.
The issue is whether it is appropriate to replace a root CA certificate (missing the digitalSignature key usage bit) with another root CA certificate (same key pair) that has the digitalSignature key usage bit set. Section 4.2.1.3 of RFC 5280 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3> says, The digitalSignature bit is asserted when the subject public key is used for verifying digital signatures, other than signatures on certificates (bit 5) and CRLs (bit 6), .... (Using a CA with the digitalSignature key usage bit set to sign OCSP responses is discussed somewhat here: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/pkix/0eZNhjidM89nB8vBbb_W7XL-QV8/.) Thanks, Ben -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[email protected]" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/CA%2B1gtaaLFoM9Ew%3DhOZ1HnBBS%3Dxo%3DjuCH_6UrjaYfgwtdDFGLyA%40mail.gmail.com.
