Hi Ryan,

Comments inline.

 

> Modifying the certificate to include the appropriate key usage will ensure 
> alignment with BRs Section 7.1.2.1, but it also creates an additional 
> violation given Sectigo’s CP and CPS prohibit modification.  

 

As far as I am aware, there is currently no blanket prohibition in the Baseline 
Requirements or in Chrome or Mozilla Root Policy on certificate modification. 
Additionally, I don’t believe Sectigo has added this language in their CP/CPS 
as a pledge to the community to remediate a previous incident. Given this, 
would an amendment to the Sectigo CP/CPS prior to certificate modification 
resolve the concern here?

 

> As far as I can tell, there are only two paths that would avoid the 
> introduction of additional policy violations in the process of aligning with 
> the BRs:

1.      Establish a delegated responder and stop direct OCSP signing using the 
CA’s key
2.      Migrate to a new root with the appropriate key usage

 

There may be a third option which avoids the complexity of OCSP delegated 
responder key management but resolves the compliance and potential client 
interoperability issues. The root can issue a self-signed end-entity OCSP 
responder certificate (same name + key as the root, but BC cA=False and EKU = 
id-kp-OCSPSigning and KU=digitalSignature, etc.) and all subsequently generated 
OCSP responses will include this certificate in the “certs” field of the 
BasicOCSPResponse. This will provide clients with the certificates necessary to 
validate the OCSP response signature, as they can build a certification path of 
root -> OCSP delegated responder certificate. Would such a solution also 
remediate the issues?

 

Thanks,

Corey

 

From: 'Ryan Dickson' via [email protected] 
<[email protected]> 
Sent: Thursday, December 16, 2021 5:23 PM
To: [email protected]
Cc: Rob Stradling <[email protected]>; Ben Wilson <[email protected]>; 
Kathleen Wilson <[email protected]>; [email protected]
Subject: Re: Root Replacement with digitalSignature Key Usage to Sign OCSP 
responses

 

[Posting on behalf of Google Chrome]

 

Hi Rob,

 

Modifying the certificate to include the appropriate key usage will ensure 
alignment with BRs Section 7.1.2.1, but it also creates an additional violation 
given Sectigo’s CP and CPS prohibit modification.  

 

Further, this example highlights one of the challenges associated with CA 
certificate modification, particularly when considering root CA certificates 
that cannot be revoked. Unless certificate consumers or relying party 
applications have a mechanism to distrust the existing certificate, it could 
still be used during OCSP response validation. While I do not believe this 
specific scenario introduces security or interoperability concerns for Chrome 
users or other relying parties, the “problem” still exists.

 

As far as I can tell, there are only two paths that would avoid the 
introduction of additional policy violations in the process of aligning with 
the BRs:

1.      Establish a delegated responder and stop direct OCSP signing using the 
CA’s key
2.      Migrate to a new root with the appropriate key usage

 

We would prefer if Sectigo committed to one of the two options above.  

 

However, in the case of  <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1652581> 
GTS, the community established a precedent, perhaps unintentionally, that 
modification was an acceptable mechanism for addressing the missing key usage 
issue. Consequently, we are willing to accept Sectigo’s proposed path forward 
(i.e., modification), recognizing that:

*       the original violation is not fully remediated 
*       the resolution triggers an additional CP violation that must be 
reported and included in a future audit report

 

As stated in my last post, to further promote ecosystem improvement and reduce 
possible future confusion, we will continue exploring whether certificate 
modification should be prohibited long-term.  

 

We'd be happy to hear other perspectives from the community.

 

Please let me know if you have any questions.

 

- Ryan

 

 

On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 5:36 PM Ryan Sleevi <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

 

 

On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 3:12 PM Rob Stradling <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

However, I'm not clear if you intended your post to also convey an opinion on 
Ryan Sleevi's view (expressed at  
<https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00224.html> 
https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00224.html and 
in  <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1741777> 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1741777) that the GTS and Sectigo 
root replacement plans will not actually remediate the perceived non-compliance 
issue. 

 

Rob,

 

I’m a bit surprised to see the verb “perceived” here; it suggests that you may 
not think there’s a non-compliance issue with the existing practice? I haven’t 
seen the final F2F minutes posted yet from the most recent CA/Browser Forum, 
but from both CAs and root programs, and from the bug itself, there seems to be 
no disagreement, except by Sectigo previously, that there is in fact a 
compliance issue. I’m not trying to be difficult, but I was just surprised a 
bit to see if phrased like that.

 

If we accept a compliance issue, then the questions that remain is whether OCSP 
responses are issued by certificates, or by key pairs/subject names, and 
whether these alternative versions of roots are in scope. That is, the only way 
this solution could be remediation is either if the (new) responses are only 
tied to the (new) certificate, or if replacement somehow fully removes the 
(old) certificate from scope.

 

It’s unclear your position on both of these. Mozilla Policy has clarified 
several times of doppelgängers being in scope, even explicitly within policy. 
Similarly, we’ve seen plenty of incidents with other CAs who have similarly 
understood and acknowledged the scope, and even crt.sh reports these as 
disclosure required, as I understand it.

 

If the digitalSignature-less certificate is in scope, and remains in scope as 
transitively valid, then the only way it seems it could not be non-compliance 
is if an OCSP response is somehow tied to a certificate, rather than a keypair.

 

We know a responderID byKey is tied to the shared key of both certificates, 
ergo the response is issued by either/or/both, and byName is tied to the 
subject name, which is also shared by both.

 

Perhaps you can explain where the compliant view comes in? It’s unclear if 
you’re arguing doppelgängers are or should be out of scope, or if this is 
revisiting the earlier argument suggesting the BRs don’t actually require 
digitalSignature for direct signing (the legacy roots).

 

I totally appreciate you’re looking for clarity from Ryan, but for those of us 
on the list (… or a beach 😅), perhaps you can articulate how you see the 
solution proposed complying with policy? It doesn’t seem that replacement can 
or should be able to declare “old” as out-of-scope, given that the whole 
purpose of replacing old with a doppelgänger is to keep everything signed by it 
valid and accepted.

 

Just because replacement doesn’t remediate, it doesn’t shut down conversation 
or remove options. It just necessitates explaining and sharing more data 
showing the things being taken into consideration. That said, if your goal is 
unambiguous remediation - without having to worry about BR kremlinology or 
consequences - it seems rolling to a new key, as Sectigo already planned to do, 
is the best way to resolve that. Why wouldn’t that be an appropriate 
(long-term) remediation? It’s unclear if the answer from Ryan is meant to 
change that prioritization, and if so, why it would?

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