Ryan,

I've read the whole thread here, the bugs linked, and prior
discussion, but am still somewhat confused about the actual issue. I'm
hoping you can clarify.

On Wed, Dec 1, 2021 at 1:42 PM Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> I captured further details about why this distinction matters, in 
> https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1741777#c5 , in examining the 
> current policies and expectations.
>
> To be clear and explicit: With respect to the digitalSignature bit itself, I 
> think this likely represents something minor on a technical level, but as I 
> tried to capture, has some interesting dimensions from the policy and 
> compliance angle. Sectigo's answer in that bug gave what they saw as the path 
> forward, but didn't really capture what the alternatives considered were, 
> what their impact was, and how that impact was assessed. These are things 
> that I think should be reasonably addressed as part of a remediation plan.

>From the bug above, and linked bugs, it seems that the status issue is
that the root certificate profile in the current version of the BRs
says "If the Root CA Private Key is used for signing OCSP responses,
then the digitalSignature bit MUST be set." You are asserting that if
_any_ certificate exists that identifies a CA in the Mozilla trust
store as the subject exists that does not assert the digitalSignature,
then that CA key may not directly sign OCSP responses.  For example,
if CA in the Mozilla trust store has an old v1 certificate issued
before the BRs, then it cannot directly sign OCSP responses, even if
the certificate in the Mozilla trust store is v3 and has the
digitalSignature bit asserted. You appear to be asserting that there
is no possible remediation action that can be taken by the CA operator
to allow this - the only two actions would be Mozilla updating the
Mozilla policy to explicitly allow this or for the CA/BF to modify the
BRs to either remove the requirement or clarify that the sentence is
not normative.

Is this an accurate representation of your view?

If so, I respectfully disagree with your view. From many prior
discussions on this list, we know that a CA is defined by its public
key and its distinguished name tuple.  In a graph, the CA is a vertex
(or node).  Certificates are edges in the graph, not vertexes.
Certificates do not control what the CA key can and cannot be used
for.  The BRs clearly differentiate between Certificates and keys in
multiple places. For example, section 6.1.7 calls out "Private Keys
corresponding to Root Certificates" and Mozilla policy section 5.3
calls out "signed with a Private Key whose corresponding Public Key is
encoded in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of that CA certificate or
intermediate certificate".

Given that the BRs and Mozilla policy understand that certificates and
keys are separate, it is not surprising that both explicitly restrict
the usage of the keys.  Section 6.1.7 of the BRs has specific limits
on one usage of CA keys and Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 of the Mozilla
policy do limit the types of signatures that can be created: "When a
root or intermediate certificate's [type] key is used to produce a
signature, only the following algorithms may be used".  Neither the
BRs nor the Mozilla policy have an overall limit on what data can be
signed.  I believe that limiting it would be good for security and
good for the WebPKI, but is not relevant to what is allowed today.

Given this, it seems there is not a policy or BR violation signing
OCSP Responses any more than there would be if a CA signed JSON Web
Tokens using its key.  The relying party or application software may
not accept these due to software defined policies that require a
certificate for the key with certain attributes, but that is not the
question.  If Mozilla (or another root program) wants to require
something specific, it should be documented.  As Rob Stradling has
pointed out, the requirements to sign an OCSP response are hazy at
best.  We know that Mozilla prefers id‐kp‐ocspSigning (OID:
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) for OCSP response signing, given section 5.1.3 of
the policy says "CAs MAY sign SHA-1 hashes over OCSP responses only if
the signing certificate contains an EKU extension which contains only
the id-kp-ocspSigning EKU."

I suggest that the Mozilla policy or the BRs be updated to clarify
several things:
1) What content can be signed by a CA key.  It should require all
content be the result of encoding an ASN.1 structure using DER and
enumerate the acceptable ASN.1 structures.
2) Explicitly state that CA key usage is independent from CA
certificate contents.

Thanks,
Peter
(my personal view and does not necessarily reflect the views of anyone else)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"[email protected]" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/CAK6vND-hGKKy9JiQAx3pa3Tz29SJMPwzswJ5Z2ZSHFUPb6cAvw%40mail.gmail.com.

Reply via email to