Ryan, I've read the whole thread here, the bugs linked, and prior discussion, but am still somewhat confused about the actual issue. I'm hoping you can clarify.
On Wed, Dec 1, 2021 at 1:42 PM Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]> wrote: > > I captured further details about why this distinction matters, in > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1741777#c5 , in examining the > current policies and expectations. > > To be clear and explicit: With respect to the digitalSignature bit itself, I > think this likely represents something minor on a technical level, but as I > tried to capture, has some interesting dimensions from the policy and > compliance angle. Sectigo's answer in that bug gave what they saw as the path > forward, but didn't really capture what the alternatives considered were, > what their impact was, and how that impact was assessed. These are things > that I think should be reasonably addressed as part of a remediation plan. >From the bug above, and linked bugs, it seems that the status issue is that the root certificate profile in the current version of the BRs says "If the Root CA Private Key is used for signing OCSP responses, then the digitalSignature bit MUST be set." You are asserting that if _any_ certificate exists that identifies a CA in the Mozilla trust store as the subject exists that does not assert the digitalSignature, then that CA key may not directly sign OCSP responses. For example, if CA in the Mozilla trust store has an old v1 certificate issued before the BRs, then it cannot directly sign OCSP responses, even if the certificate in the Mozilla trust store is v3 and has the digitalSignature bit asserted. You appear to be asserting that there is no possible remediation action that can be taken by the CA operator to allow this - the only two actions would be Mozilla updating the Mozilla policy to explicitly allow this or for the CA/BF to modify the BRs to either remove the requirement or clarify that the sentence is not normative. Is this an accurate representation of your view? If so, I respectfully disagree with your view. From many prior discussions on this list, we know that a CA is defined by its public key and its distinguished name tuple. In a graph, the CA is a vertex (or node). Certificates are edges in the graph, not vertexes. Certificates do not control what the CA key can and cannot be used for. The BRs clearly differentiate between Certificates and keys in multiple places. For example, section 6.1.7 calls out "Private Keys corresponding to Root Certificates" and Mozilla policy section 5.3 calls out "signed with a Private Key whose corresponding Public Key is encoded in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of that CA certificate or intermediate certificate". Given that the BRs and Mozilla policy understand that certificates and keys are separate, it is not surprising that both explicitly restrict the usage of the keys. Section 6.1.7 of the BRs has specific limits on one usage of CA keys and Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 of the Mozilla policy do limit the types of signatures that can be created: "When a root or intermediate certificate's [type] key is used to produce a signature, only the following algorithms may be used". Neither the BRs nor the Mozilla policy have an overall limit on what data can be signed. I believe that limiting it would be good for security and good for the WebPKI, but is not relevant to what is allowed today. Given this, it seems there is not a policy or BR violation signing OCSP Responses any more than there would be if a CA signed JSON Web Tokens using its key. The relying party or application software may not accept these due to software defined policies that require a certificate for the key with certain attributes, but that is not the question. If Mozilla (or another root program) wants to require something specific, it should be documented. As Rob Stradling has pointed out, the requirements to sign an OCSP response are hazy at best. We know that Mozilla prefers id‐kp‐ocspSigning (OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) for OCSP response signing, given section 5.1.3 of the policy says "CAs MAY sign SHA-1 hashes over OCSP responses only if the signing certificate contains an EKU extension which contains only the id-kp-ocspSigning EKU." I suggest that the Mozilla policy or the BRs be updated to clarify several things: 1) What content can be signed by a CA key. It should require all content be the result of encoding an ASN.1 structure using DER and enumerate the acceptable ASN.1 structures. 2) Explicitly state that CA key usage is independent from CA certificate contents. Thanks, Peter (my personal view and does not necessarily reflect the views of anyone else) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[email protected]" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/CAK6vND-hGKKy9JiQAx3pa3Tz29SJMPwzswJ5Z2ZSHFUPb6cAvw%40mail.gmail.com.
