It seems that some of the criteria in the draft policy are subjective to some degree. At the same time the policy leaves zero margin for error (If X then you MUST use this code, otherwise you MUST NOT). The combination of these two seems to ensure that mistakes will happen, and we will see a continuous stream of incident reports where a CA and a community member disagrees about a subjective aspect of these criteria. Could the policy be updated to give the CA freedom to choose in gray areas?
There have already been several posts in this thread discussing if a CSR can be considered proof of possession of a private key. I don't think a CSR is secret and therefore cannot automatically be considered proof of possession, and I think the policy should state that explicitly. The policy says revocations before the effective date does not need to be changed. What about revocations after the effective date? What if a certificate was revoked as superseded and later the CA receives evidence of key compromise? Must the reason code then be changed? Den tir. 1. feb. 2022 kl. 19.04 skrev Kathleen Wilson <[email protected]>: > I have re-written the bright green text in the draft policy > <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ESakR4MiwyENyuLefyH2wG8rYbtnmG1xeSYvDNpS-EI/edit?usp=sharing> > to separate out the scope of revocation from the requirement to use the > keyCompromise reason. > > So the proposed text is as follows: > == > The CRLReason keyCompromise (1) MUST be used when one or more of the > following occurs: > - the CA obtains verifiable evidence that the certificate subscriber’s > private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate suffered a > key compromise; > - the CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the > certificate subscriber’s private key to compromise; > - there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the > private key was flawed; > - the CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily > compute the certificate subscriber’s private key based on the public key in > - the certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see > https://wiki.debian.org/TLSkeys); or > - the certificate subscriber requests that the CA revoke the certificate > for this reason. > > The scope of revocation depends on whether the certificate subscriber has > proven possession of the private key of the certificate. > - If the certificate subscriber has previously demonstrated or can > currently demonstrate possession of the private key of the certificate, > then the CA MUST revoke all instances of that key across all subscribers. > - Otherwise, the CA SHOULD limit revocation to only the instance of that > key that the certificate subscriber had submitted the Certificate Signing > Request (CSR) for. > == > > I will continue to appreciate your feedback on this, and especially your > input on how to make this more accurate. > > Thanks, > Kathleen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups " > [email protected]" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/24a3a885-dfd3-45f1-a5aa-9928c89fe6c1n%40mozilla.org > <https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/24a3a885-dfd3-45f1-a5aa-9928c89fe6c1n%40mozilla.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[email protected]" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/CACAF_WgAmV1uopbEKAEmW0n6kwyTSKaT-HegsYjbJsbJET_gXg%40mail.gmail.com.
