I don’t think you can currently do that, though, not without having the exact issue we’re discussing.
That is, TLS doesn’t require a POP, there are no rules that require CAs require a POP (and, as discussed, good reason for that), so if you see another CA has revoked a cert, you cannot safely revoke certs within your database. There’s been some discussion about this in the past, where CAs aren’t expected to comb other CA’s CRLs, and from a “Delegated Third Party” perspective, reasonable to not do that. So if CAs are doing it today, they’re already in a bad spot - and this would help correct it? On Wed, Feb 2, 2022 at 6:19 PM Seo Suchan <[email protected]> wrote: > I'm not really sure about weaking the meaning of keycompromise. Currently > if I saw a cert revoked it by keycompomised then one can throw its public > key into 'leaked keys' bin and propargate key-purging between CA by > pointing other CAs revoke this certifiate with same key as compromised- > like multiple smime certificates from different CAs as there is no CT and > first one who revoked key may not know that second cert with same key exsit. > > although right thing to do such case would be notify the original holder > in first revocation and let subscriber call the key with other CA they > signed or have some kind of central leaked-publickey-here repository. > > sent again, to the list this time > 2022-02-03 오전 7:35에 Ryan Sleevi 이(가) 쓴 글: > > > > On Wed, Feb 2, 2022 at 7:25 AM Doug Beattie <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Will the CA block further issuance when the request for revocation does >> not include PoP which could DoS them for renewal using the same key pair? >> To me, if the subscriber can’t provide PoP of the private key the >> unspecified reason code would be more accurate. What’s the value to the >> subscriber, CA and ecosystem to treat that case as key compromise vs. >> unspecified? >> >> >> >> I’m probably just not understanding the background and value for the >> second rule around processing requests for revocation with key compromise >> without PoP. >> > > As hopefully my reply to Aaron captured a little, it's about where the > burden rests. > > Today, for most TLS issuance, no POP is required. That's because TLS > itself doesn't need a POP, because it's an online protocol - the POP is > delivered in-band, and it's not an identity-attestation system based on a > directory (e.g. compared to S/MIME, where a sender needs to look up your > public key ahead of time to encrypt something to you) > > So the functional change of requiring the POP is that very few people, > today, could request keyCompromise without doing more work. That's not > ideal. > Further, however, is that for situations that are not uncommon, such as > malicious deletion or ransomware, there is zero guarantee the victim would > be able to prove keyCompromise at that time. > > This is very similar to the discussions in the past of how many hoops a CA > can place to request revocation (i.e. "You can only request revocation on > the fifth Tuesday of every February under the full moon"). For Subscribers, > and users, this matters. > > However, an additional consideration is that keyCompromise revocations > *are* likely more valuable than other forms of revocations, both in terms > of efficient and timely delivery and in user risk. A policy that restricts > when and how Subscribers can request this revocation is thus one that > limits the value of that, by making it harder, which harms end users more. > The more barriers placed for Subscribers, the harder it is to get this > information in a timely fashion. > > So, to end users, it's ideal where Subscribers can request any revocation > reason that they want (... within reason), and for imposing obligations on > CAs, to use particular revocation reasons when they're made aware, either > internally or by externally reports. That protects users the most. > > However, because there's no POP, that does offer _some_ abuse scenarios > from malicious entities wishing to abuse the policies, and so some > safeguards are needed. The question posed to this group is, seemingly, do > we want to throw the baby out with the bathwater? Namely, should > Subscribers have flexibility to (as easily as possible) request the method > of their choice, or is the risk of abuse too great to trust them? > > I'd like to find a solution where we can empower Subscribers as much as > possible, because that can help protect Users the greatest. I think you're > right that we want to figure out how to narrowly scope the abuse scenarios, > so definitely, thanks for raising 6.1.1.3. We should try to find a way to > best balance things, don't you agree? > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "[email protected]" > <[email protected]> group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/topic/dev-security-policy/RVFnJJRuUag/unsubscribe > . > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/CAErg%3DHEaptK1R7PMBFNYvp6_hHcMD4FRL7C3b4OP1yK2YaJFzQ%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/CAErg%3DHEaptK1R7PMBFNYvp6_hHcMD4FRL7C3b4OP1yK2YaJFzQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups " > [email protected]" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/fc5dcfda-d14f-a868-364a-d96341df7563%40gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/fc5dcfda-d14f-a868-364a-d96341df7563%40gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "[email protected]" group. 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