Kyle,
Kyle Hamilton wrote:
So, essentially, what you're saying is that it was a targeted attack
against a user, instead of an attack targeted against a server?
Apparently, keeping track of keys in certificates placed individually
into NSS might be a good idea regardless.
The attacker absolutely didn't have to reuse the same key for this
attack. He could have regenerated a new key on the fly for every site
the user visited.
Remember that there are plenty of cases where it's perfectly valid to
reuse the same keypair - cases like cross-certification.
Even if we detected duplicate public keys between certs in NSS, that is
not necessarily something we want to fail on. We would have to know that
the keys have been assigned to completely different entities, as in the
example Nelson posted. Sometimes it may be unclear, for example if
somebody changes CA, or changes domain and happens to reuse the same
private key for 2 different certs.
This kind of attack is easily mitigated - the certs were self-signed.
That's a dead giveaway that the user shouldn't accept them.
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