Presumably it was Comodo that underwent an audit to be added to Mozilla's roots, and Comodo should not be allowed to delegate trust to their resellers for domain validation. If, today, trust is delegated to their resellers, then we can't trust Comodo, period.
Although disruptive, their trust bits should be suspended. The explanation to users: "The CA purporting to provide assurance about the site you are trying to visit cannot be trusted. Please contact the site operator and advise them to find a trustworthy certification authority." Yes, perception is that Mozilla releases code expressly to "break" access to legitimate sites, but this is because a trusted CA has gone rogue. Users can still jump through hoops to expressly include the site's certificate and keep going. The trust model for browsers should be fail-safe, even if this inconveniences users. Better that than me and countless others inadvertently exposing my credentials to a site pretending to be my bank, investment house, government revenue agency, etc. If Mozilla doesn't pull the trust bits, what's it's accountability for any breaches that occur due to keeping the bits? With assurance must come liability, whether from the certification authority, or those who are implicitly trusted with vetting them. _______________________________________________ dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
