Plugins, providers, and their associated Python libraries all need to execute code in order to be installed which is a vulnerability. Plugins in particular are often developed/installed by the data engineers and not by system administrators, leading us back to our original problem.
I would turn your argument the other way around--if you're already in a no-install, serialized model for DAGs why not extend that to all aspects of the webserver such as connections and UI plugins? Seems that would be more consistent. On 2021-06-18, 1:36 PM, "Jarek Potiuk" <[email protected]> wrote: CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe. > That would certainly help a bit, but unfortunately it's not just the packages. It's the fact that authentication is tied to Python code that can be patched by anyone with permission to execute code on the web server, which in turn would give them access to packages or any anything else they'd like. But in Airflow 2.0 the code provided by "DAG writers" is not executed any more. This is entirely gone together with Airflow 1.10. This has been handled by DAG serialization, which is the only option available in 2.0. I do not see how the "Users" could add any code if "Admins" control the packages that are installed in the webserver. Now if Admin/User is the only problem then I think this is really misunderstanding coming from the pre-DAG-serialization world of Apache Airflow. J.
