Hi all, While going through the BI repo's PII handling, I noticed the docs still described client_hash as unsalted MD5, though platform.sql now uses keyed HMAC-SHA256. I've opened a small docs fix for that: https://github.com/apache/fineract-business-intelligence/pull/131
That led me to the dashboard row scoping, which I'd like to work on next: enforcing it inside Postgres, as defence in depth on top of the Superset datasets. Today the scoping lives in the 6 superset/datasets/*.sql files, so it only applies to queries that go through those datasets. analytics_reader itself can read the marts unfiltered, which SECURITY.md §9 already notes for SQL Lab. Rough idea: - Postgres RLS policies (ENABLE + FORCE) on the analytics marts, reusing meta.user_scope / meta.is_admin_user, applied from a dbt macro so rebuilds and full refreshes keep them - Carry the Superset user into the session in a way a SQL Lab user can't overwrite. A plain session variable won't work, since set_config isn't blocked in SQL Lab. Options I see: per-user Postgres roles with Superset impersonation, or a signed user token checked by a SECURITY DEFINER function - Turn on CACHE_QUERY_BY_USER (or keep the username in the cache key), so cached chart data isn't shared across users once the datasets stop calling current_username() - Run the existing test_rls_isolation.py suite against the policies, plus tests that raw SQL as analytics_reader is filtered too Questions before I start: 1. Would you accept this, given SQL Lab restriction is currently listed in SECURITY.md §9 as not provided? 2. Any preference between impersonation and a signed token, or would you rather rely on Superset's own RLS filters (RLS_IN_SQLLAB is still marked testing)? Thanks, Abhishek Chaudhary
