Thanks for the write-up, and for the HMAC docs fix. This is a worthwhile direction. A few thoughts from my end.
Please write down the threat model first. The right design depends on which of these we are defending against: (a) a Superset user running arbitrary SQL in SQL Lab on the shared reader connection; (b) a leaked or misused analytics_reader credential used directly with psql. For (a) there may be a much cheaper fix than RLS. If the reader database connection is created with "Expose in SQL Lab" turned off, charts and dashboards keep working but nobody can type SQL against it. Please check whether that works in the Superset 4.1.1 we pin. If it does, SQL Lab restriction stops being "not provided" in SECURITY.md §9 with only a config change and a test. For (b), a signed token does not help: whoever holds the credential can set any session variable and replay any token. Only per-user roles do. FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY would break dbt. The marts are owned by the loader role (dbt). With FORCE, the policies would apply to the owner too, so dbt's incremental windows, its deletes and its tests would see no rows. I'd create the policies only for analytics_reader and not use FORCE, or add an explicit permissive policy for the loader. Watch for a fail-open gap when tables are rebuilt. In the roles script we set default privileges so the reader automatically gets read access to anything the loader creates in the analytics schema. That means a freshly recreated mart (full refresh, table materialization) is readable by the reader immediately, before the on-run-end macro has switched RLS on for it. I'd prefer the policy to be applied in a per-model post-hook inside the same transaction, or by an event trigger that fires when a table is created in that schema. Whichever we pick, add a catalog test that every table in the analytics schema has row security enabled, so a new mart can't ship unprotected. On how to pass the user. You're right that a plain session setting can't be trusted: a SQL Lab user can overwrite it. Signed token: this needs a query hook in Superset that sets it for every statement, including async queries, scheduled reports and thumbnails, which run as a different executor. It must be transaction-local or set on every statement, because pooled connections would otherwise carry one user's identity into the next request. A missing or expired token must give zero rows. Per-user roles with impersonation: this is the stronger option, since there is no shared secret and it covers (b). Please verify that Superset 4.1.1's PostgreSQL engine spec supports impersonation, because I'm not sure it does. If it works by switching roles, a user can switch back, so the connection role must see nothing and only the per-user roles can see rows. The cost is provisioning and syncing roles with Superset users. Superset's own RLS filters: I wouldn't rely on them for this. The SQL Lab flag for them is still marked as testing and it works on SQL parsing, which is the weakest of the options. You are right about the cache. Today the username is part of the rendered SQL, and the Jinja username helper adds itself to the cache key, so cached chart data is per user. Once the datasets stop using it, they would share a cache entry. Please turn on Superset's per-user query caching and add a test for it. Performance. The marts are loan-by-day tables, so the policy must evaluate the user's scope once per query (a sub-select so it becomes an init plan), not once per row, and the existing user-scope function approach should be benchmarked on a large mart. Suggested plan in small steps: (1) a short design note with the threat model; (2) the SQL Lab configuration change, if it works; (3) deny-by-default RLS for the reader role plus the catalog test; (4) the identity mechanism, if still needed. Each step can be its own issue and PR, and test_rls_isolation.py can be extended at each step, including raw SQL as analytics_reader. Please open an issue with the design note before coding so the maintainers can weigh in on question 1. Best, Aira On 2026-11-14 07:56 UTC Abhishek Chaudhary wrote: > Hi all, > > While going through the BI repo's PII handling, I noticed the docs still > described client_hash as unsalted MD5, though platform.sql now uses keyed > HMAC-SHA256. I've opened a small docs fix for that: > https://github.com/apache/fineract-business-intelligence/pull/131 > > That led me to the dashboard row scoping, which I'd like to work on next: > enforcing it inside Postgres, as defence in depth on top of the Superset > datasets. > > Today the scoping lives in the 6 superset/datasets/*.sql files, so it only > applies to queries that go through those datasets. analytics_reader itself > can read the marts unfiltered, which SECURITY.md §9 already notes for SQL > Lab. > > Rough idea: > - Postgres RLS policies (ENABLE + FORCE) on the analytics marts, reusing > meta.user_scope / meta.is_admin_user, applied from a dbt macro so rebuilds > and full refreshes keep them > - Carry the Superset user into the session in a way a SQL Lab user can't > overwrite. A plain session variable won't work, since set_config isn't > blocked in SQL Lab. Options I see: per-user Postgres roles with Superset > impersonation, or a signed user token checked by a SECURITY DEFINER function > - Turn on CACHE_QUERY_BY_USER (or keep the username in the cache key), so > cached chart data isn't shared across users once the datasets stop calling > current_username() > - Run the existing test_rls_isolation.py suite against the policies, plus > tests that raw SQL as analytics_reader is filtered too > > Questions before I start: > 1. Would you accept this, given SQL Lab restriction is currently listed in > SECURITY.md §9 as not provided? > 2. Any preference between impersonation and a signed token, or would you > rather rely on Superset's own RLS filters (RLS_IN_SQLLAB is still marked > testing)? > > Thanks, > Abhishek Chaudhary >
