lmccay commented on pull request #477: URL: https://github.com/apache/knox/pull/477#issuecomment-894688536
> I'm pretty worried about where this is going - where it looks like it spawns shells on the Knox host. This opens up a wide range of attacks potentially and doesn't look like there is protection against those. @moresandeep hinted at a bunch of them in the review as well. > > Secondarily, not sure why we are copying full JS and CSS files without much attribution or versions where they came from. Most of the newer UIs are using npm to at least ensure we are declaring our dependencies. > > https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KNOX-2631 doesn't seem to have much detail about the design of this feature so not sure if this is POC or what, but I don't think its close to ready to be merged. It is indeed POC status. @luliu8 is interning with us and this is a first iteration PR. The codereview details are great here, @risdenk and will help clean this up for the next iteration. The security implications are also being considered and will ultimately be reviewed closely. The idea here is to strictly allow the same sort of trusted proxy based impersonation for Shell access as we do for all other proxied resources. We will need the same level of protections for this as we have for hadoop trusted proxies. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at: [email protected]
