It is still a valid mitigation. Mike Drobban I explained it. MDC is the other attack vector and that's not an issue with Solr.
Please accept this, just because the documentation of log4j changes, there's no additional risk. We may update the mitigation to mention that in Solr's case the system property is fine. Uwe Am 14. Dezember 2021 22:52:29 UTC schrieb solr <fred...@rodland.no>: >Ok. > >But FTR - apache/log4j has discredited just setting the system property as a >mitigation measure, so I still think the SOLR security-page should be changed >to not list this as a valid mitigation: > >https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/security.html >"Older (discredited) mitigation measures > >This page previously mentioned other mitigation measures, but we discovered >that these measures only limit exposure while leaving some attack vectors open. > >Other insufficient mitigation measures are: setting system property >log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups or environment variable LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS >to true for releases >= 2.10, or modifying the logging configuration to >disable message lookups with %m{nolookups}, %msg{nolookups} or >%message{nolookups} for releases >= 2.7 and <= 2.14.1. >“ > >Regards, > > >Fredrik > > >-- >Fredrik Rødland Cell: +47 99 21 98 17 >Maisen Pedersens vei 1 Twitter: @fredrikr >NO-1363 Høvik, NORWAY flickr: http://www.flickr.com/fmmr/ >http://rodland.no about.me http://about.me/fmr > > > >> On 14 Dec 2021, at 23:44, Mike Drob <md...@mdrob.com> wrote: >> >> The MDC Patterns used by solr are for the collection, shard, replica, core >> and node names, and a potential trace id. All of those are restricted to >> alphanumeric, no special characters like $ or { needed for the injection. >> And trying to access a collection that didn’t exist Returns 404 without >> logging. >> >> Upgrading is always going to be more complete, but I think we’re still ok >> for now, at least until the next iteration of this attack surfaces. >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 14, 2021 at 3:37 PM solr <fred...@rodland.no> wrote: >> Only setting -Dlog4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true might not be enough to >> mitigate the log4j vulnerability. >> >> See https://github.com/kmindi/log4shell-vulnerable-app >> “So even with LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS true version 2.14.1 of log4j is >> vulnerable when using ThreadContextMap in PatternLayout.” >> >> ThreadContext.put(key, value) is used under the hood by MDC. I’m not sure >> wether any user-input is actually stored in MDC in SOLR. >> >> >> Probably this should be updated: >> https://solr.apache.org/security.html#apache-solr-affected-by-apache-log4j-cve-2021-44228 >> >> And maybe consider releasing patch releases for other versions than 8.11 as >> well which includes log4j 2.16.0? >> >> >> >> Regards, >> >> >> Fredrik >> >> >> -- >> Fredrik Rødland Cell: +47 99 21 98 17 >> Maisen Pedersens vei 1 Twitter: @fredrikr >> NO-1363 Høvik, NORWAY flickr: http://www.flickr.com/fmmr/ >> http://rodland.no about.me http://about.me/fmr >> >> >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscr...@lucene.apache.org >> For additional commands, e-mail: dev-h...@lucene.apache.org >> > > >--------------------------------------------------------------------- >To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscr...@lucene.apache.org >For additional commands, e-mail: dev-h...@lucene.apache.org > -- Uwe Schindler Achterdiek 19, 28357 Bremen https://www.thetaphi.de
