The other attack vectors are also not possible with Solr:

- Logger.printf("%s", userInput) is not used
- custom message factory is not used

Uwe

Am 14. Dezember 2021 22:59:26 UTC schrieb Uwe Schindler <u...@thetaphi.de>:
>It is still a valid mitigation.
>
>Mike Drobban I explained it. MDC is the other attack vector and that's not an 
>issue with Solr.
>
>Please accept this, just because the documentation of log4j changes, there's 
>no additional risk. We may update the mitigation to mention that in Solr's 
>case the system property is fine.
>
>Uwe
>
>Am 14. Dezember 2021 22:52:29 UTC schrieb solr <fred...@rodland.no>:
>>Ok.
>>
>>But FTR - apache/log4j has discredited just setting the system property as a 
>>mitigation measure, so I still think the SOLR security-page should be changed 
>>to not list this as a valid mitigation:
>>
>>https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/security.html
>>"Older (discredited) mitigation measures
>>
>>This page previously mentioned other mitigation measures, but we discovered 
>>that these measures only limit exposure while leaving some attack vectors 
>>open.
>>
>>Other insufficient mitigation measures are: setting system property 
>>log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups or environment variable LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS 
>>to true for releases >= 2.10, or modifying the logging configuration to 
>>disable message lookups with %m{nolookups}, %msg{nolookups} or 
>>%message{nolookups} for releases >= 2.7 and <= 2.14.1.
>>“
>>
>>Regards,
>>
>>
>>Fredrik
>>
>>
>>--
>>Fredrik Rødland               Cell:    +47 99 21 98 17
>>Maisen Pedersens vei 1        Twitter: @fredrikr
>>NO-1363 Høvik, NORWAY         flickr:  http://www.flickr.com/fmmr/
>>http://rodland.no             about.me http://about.me/fmr
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 14 Dec 2021, at 23:44, Mike Drob <md...@mdrob.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> The MDC Patterns used by solr are for the collection, shard, replica, core 
>>> and node names, and a potential trace id. All of those are restricted to 
>>> alphanumeric, no special characters like $ or { needed for the injection. 
>>> And trying to access a collection that didn’t exist Returns 404 without 
>>> logging.
>>> 
>>> Upgrading is always going to be more complete, but I think we’re still ok 
>>> for now, at least until the next iteration of this attack surfaces.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Dec 14, 2021 at 3:37 PM solr <fred...@rodland.no> wrote:
>>> Only setting -Dlog4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true might not be enough to 
>>> mitigate the log4j vulnerability.
>>> 
>>> See https://github.com/kmindi/log4shell-vulnerable-app
>>> “So even with LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS true version 2.14.1 of log4j is 
>>> vulnerable when using ThreadContextMap in PatternLayout.”
>>> 
>>> ThreadContext.put(key, value) is used under the hood by MDC.  I’m not sure 
>>> wether any user-input is actually stored in MDC in SOLR.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Probably this should be updated: 
>>> https://solr.apache.org/security.html#apache-solr-affected-by-apache-log4j-cve-2021-44228
>>> 
>>> And maybe consider releasing patch releases for other versions than 8.11 as 
>>> well which includes log4j 2.16.0?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Fredrik
>>> 
>>> 
>>> --
>>> Fredrik Rødland               Cell:    +47 99 21 98 17
>>> Maisen Pedersens vei 1        Twitter: @fredrikr
>>> NO-1363 Høvik, NORWAY         flickr:  http://www.flickr.com/fmmr/
>>> http://rodland.no             about.me http://about.me/fmr
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
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>>
>>
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>
>--
>Uwe Schindler
>Achterdiek 19, 28357 Bremen
>https://www.thetaphi.de
--
Uwe Schindler
Achterdiek 19, 28357 Bremen
https://www.thetaphi.de

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