Burke, sorry for not being clear before. I think what you said in #1 is pretty much what i'm asking for.
The terminology can be worked out (to use your example 'Access' could imply API-level privileges, and 'View' could imply app-level privileges), but the important thing to me would be to not have 'Access Patient Data' sometimes be applied at the API level and sometimes applied at the app level. With 'Access Patient Data' used at both the API and app layers, if I restrict 'Access Patient Data' for a user, it is incredibly difficult to tell what i've actually restricted. This is when pieces of the application, other than the one I was trying to restrict, start throwing errors unexpectedly (per mark's example). Part two of this argument (and maybe this is a different discussion) would be that once there was a clear distinction between api and app level privileges, the app level privileges could start to reflect actual UI components a little more. If each portlet on the patient dashboard had its own privilege for example, like 'view regimen tab', the UI would be a LOT more easy to customise in a meaningful way using privileges and roles. d On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Burke Mamlin <bmam...@regenstrief.org>wrote: > Mark, > > This is an interesting point. Your example helps me understand Dave's > point and suggests that we should distinguish between "Access Patient Data" > and "View Patient Data" – i.e., the use of "View" in the privilege term > describing API-level access to data per our conventions implies that > getting data at the API level also means that the user should be able to > view it within the application, which is not always the case. In your > example (a person being able to view aggregate patient data without viewing > individual patient records), we have two choices: > > 1. Grant the user "Access Patient Data" as the API-level privilege, > meaning that they would be permitted to execute API calls that return > patient information, but would not imply that the application should let > them view the data directly. > > 2. Allow the methods that need to access patient data to proxy > privileges for the user. > > The first seems like the better option to me. Proxying privileges seems > like a hacky way to override privileges that are there for a reason. The > first option will take some effort (maybe more than the upcoming sprint can > muster), but seems like a better long-term solution. Maybe we can come up > with a way to start heading that direction. > > -Burke > > > On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 3:55 PM, Mark Goodrich <mgoodr...@pih.org> wrote: > >> +1 for this. We’ve run into issues with this a lot. For instance, say >> you have a user who should not be able to view patients, but should have >> access to a report of aggregate patient data that calls getPatients() >> behind the scenes to perform the necessary calculations. If you take away >> the “view patient” privilege from the user, they’ll get a stack trace when >> they attempt to execute the report.**** >> >> ** ** >> >> This issue has been prevalent enough for us that we basically are unable >> to use privileges and roles for access control … **** >> >> ** ** >> >> Mark**** >> >> ** ** >> >> ** ** >> >> *From:* dev@openmrs.org [mailto:dev@openmrs.org] *On Behalf Of *Dave >> Thomas >> *Sent:* Wednesday, May 09, 2012 2:51 PM >> *To:* openmrs-deve...@listserv.iupui.edu >> *Subject:* Re: [OPENMRS-DEV] Roles and Privileges Sprint**** >> >> ** ** >> >> If i can weigh in on a discussion of roles and privileges briefly, I've >> found (and maybe things are improved in versions greater than 1.6.x) that >> we've run into trouble when a privilege is used both at the api and web >> layer. This happens when we want to hide something in the UI that is >> wrapped in a <privilege/> tag, but then when we remove that privilege for a >> user, it turns out that the same privilege was wrapped around a couple of >> API methods, causing unexpected and hard-to-track-down UI problems across >> all of openmrs. >> >> If there's a dedicated pass at roles+privileges, has there been any >> thought to separating api privileges from ui privileges? I kind of feel >> like this is low-hanging fruit. This wouldn't even need re-architecting, >> maybe just privilege naming conventions? >> >> Or is the general sense that this type of problem has disappeared in >> newer versions? >> >> d**** >> >> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 10:29 AM, Burke Mamlin <bu...@openmrs.org> wrote:* >> *** >> >> (bringing this conversation about preparing for the Roles & Privileges >> sprint onto the dev list)**** >> >> ** ** >> >> Reviewing the notes <http://notes.openmrs.org/2012-roadmap> on Roles & >> Permissions section from Jembi & PIH, it looks like there are some >> fundamental improvements requested:**** >> >> - Ship OpenMRS with pre-defined roles**** >> - Better documentation on managing roles (avoiding pitfalls)**** >> - More informative handling of privilege exceptions (make it easier >> to understand where/which privileges are missing)**** >> - Data-level permissions (restricting access to specific data based >> on privileges)**** >> >> We've had prior conversations about improving roles/privileges:**** >> >> - Avoiding the common pitfall of conflating organizational roles (job >> title) with application roles (authorization within OpenMRS); they may >> align early on in simple systems, but exceptions are common over time or >> as >> a a system grows.**** >> - Creating privilege groups vs. programmatically defined roles – >> e.g., a web page wants to limit access to those who have a set of >> privileges.**** >> - Introducing location-based privileges**** >> >> There seem to be some potential short-term wins that could be done in the >> sprint:**** >> >> - Improve our documentation to better introduce people to roles & >> privileges and cover the common pitfalls.**** >> - Improve privilege error messages in core and/or create a module >> that makes it easier to troubleshoot privilege errors (e.g., log all >> privilege checks during an operation and present the unique list of >> privileges and/or roles that would cover the operation, allowing someone >> to >> step through a workflow as superuser and then see the list of privileges >> required to complete the workflow).**** >> - Come up with some basic application roles that can be pre-defined >> within OpenMRS (ship with the application)**** >> - Design (and, if possible, implement) an approach for privilege >> groups or system roles (i.e., uneditable sets of privileges that >> applications can program against)**** >> >> Data-level privileges (limiting access to data based on privileges) would >> be a terrific addition, but I'm afraid it will take more design that we can >> muster between now & the beginning of this sprint. Maybe we could come up >> with some small but useful first attempts at solving this problem (e.g., a >> module requiring permissions to access certain observations … or a module >> that limits access to specific patients based on permissions).**** >> >> ** ** >> >> Cheers,**** >> >> ** ** >> >> -Burke**** >> >> ** ** >> >> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 9:49 AM, Burke Mamlin <bu...@openmrs.org> wrote:** >> ** >> >> Looking back at notes from AMPATH, the only reference to anything close >> to roles & privileges I found was the desire for the Data Entry Statistics >> Module to have a basic view privilege that allows a data assistant to see >> only his/her own statistics.**** >> >> ** ** >> >> -Burke**** >> >> ** ** >> >> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 9:44 AM, Ben Wolfe <b...@openmrs.org> wrote:**** >> >> Dawn found this link for me: >> http://notes.openmrs.org/2012-roadmap >> >> Is has the (mostly raw) notes from the calls we had with >> Jembi/PIH/AMPATH. >> >> Daniel, can you tease out the topics from that and the other text below >> in the next 4 hours? >> >> Ben**** >> >> ** ** >> ------------------------------ >> >> Click here to >> unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from >> OpenMRS Developers' mailing list >> **** >> >> ** ** >> ------------------------------ >> >> Click here to >> unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from >> OpenMRS Developers' mailing list >> **** >> ------------------------------ >> Click here to >> unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from >> OpenMRS Developers' mailing list >> > > ------------------------------ > Click here to > unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from > OpenMRS Developers' mailing list > _________________________________________ To unsubscribe from OpenMRS Developers' mailing list, send an e-mail to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with "SIGNOFF openmrs-devel-l" in the body (not the subject) of your e-mail. 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