I don't think privileges should be named after pages; rather, they should be named according to application behavior (i.e., function). If we adopt a "Page Name - View Xyz Section" convention, then we'll end up with a whole bunch of unnecessary privileges. For example, if there are fourteen pages between core & modules that present a list of allergies, then we don't want to have to manage 14 privileges to see allergies; rather, all of the pages should use a single privilege that is specific to displaying allergies to the user.
The fundamental problem is that we chose "View" in our API privileges. How about getting the list of all "View Xyz" privileges and doing a global search & replace like s/View (Abc|Def|Ghi|…|Xyz)/Access $1/g. Seems like a decent task for a roles & privileges Sprint. Then we can use "View Patient" for, well, *viewing* a patient, no matter which page or which context. -Burke On Thu, May 10, 2012 at 2:49 AM, Darius Jazayeri <djazayeri+...@gmail.com>wrote: > This makes perfect sense. And I agree that we can handle this merely by > using a naming convention. For sake of not changing the names of the bulk > of existing privileges (and privilege.name is the pk of that table), I > propose that we go with: > > (api-level privileges, stick with the same naming) > > - View Xyz (for metadata and data) > - Manage Xyz (for metadata) > - Add Xyz, Edit Xyz, Delete Xyz, Purge Xyz (for data) > > (application-level privileges, follow the pattern from > patientDashboardForm.jsp) > > - Page Name - View Xyz Section > > > (Ironically patientDashboardForm.jsp is the *only* jsp page I'm aware of > where we've actually done this right. So yes, good choice of example. :-) ) > > So, I guess the proper solution is to look at all of our jsp and jsp-like > files (.tag, and anything else?) for <openmrs:hasPrivilege, and identify > every one of those in core (and ideally also bundled modules) that uses an > API-level privilege. (This will be 90% of them.) > > Then, for this list of privilege checks, we need to: > 1. create a new, matching application-layer privilege > 2. switch the jsp to check against the new privilege > 3. write a liquibase changeset that will grant the new application-level > privilege to every role that has the old api-level privilege. > > -Darius > > > On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 11:16 PM, Dave Thomas <pihd...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> First I apologise for using the dashboard as an example -- it was >> hypothetical, and therefore crappy. >> >> And yes, your suggestion is exactly right, but it's a pattern that I >> think should be applied globally, and not just to the patient dashboard >> components. >> >> Here's another example: 'View Concepts' is required by gutter.jsp to >> show the Dictionary gutter item. There's no reason why our data officers >> or lab technicians need to be looking up concepts through the UI. They >> just need to be able to fill out forms and look at patient records for data >> quality. We've also had instances where research staff have looked for >> Concepts associated with specific forms without really knowing the correct >> way to do this, which resulted in bad data being exported. Without access >> to the Dictionary, they would have been forced to ask us for help. >> >> So there are a couple of groups of people for whom i'd like to hide the >> Dictionary gutter item. >> >> But if you take away 'View Concepts' for a user, this basically breaks >> all of OpenMRS for that user. More than 1/2 the ConceptService requires >> this privilege. >> >> This is kind of an extreme example in terms of the functionality that >> would be lost by removing the privilege. I feel like we've run into more >> subtle 'accidental' restrictions mistakes that might only manifest >> themselves in 1 or 2 unexpected places, sometimes in a module, or maybe in >> the various reporting mechanisms we've used. >> >> What i think would be a good step forward would be a complete separation >> between privileges used by the app layer and privileges used by the api, >> which I think could be handled through naming conventions for privileges. >> This doesn't require any new architecture, but would greatly increase the >> granularity of what you can restrict and for whom. Privileges used >> concurrently in app and api layers are too blunt of an instrument, and lead >> to (sometimes strikingly) sub-optimal role configurations. >> >> I know that increased granularity seems like it would lead to greater >> complexity for implementations, but i'd argue that at least in our >> experience its the opposite. >> >> Does this make sense? >> >> d >> >> >> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 5:24 PM, Darius Jazayeri >> <djazayeri+...@gmail.com>wrote: >> >>> All dashboard tabs *do* have application-level privileges already. At >>> least in 1.9.x, patientDashboardForm.jsp has: >>> >>> <openmrs:hasPrivilege privilege="Patient Dashboard - View Overview >>> Section"> >>> <openmrs:hasPrivilege privilege="Patient Dashboard - View Regimen >>> Section"> >>> <openmrs:hasPrivilege privilege="Patient Dashboard - View Visits >>> Section"> >>> <openmrs:hasPrivilege privilege="Patient Dashboard - View Encounters >>> Section"> >>> <openmrs:hasPrivilege privilege="Patient Dashboard - View Demographics >>> Section"> >>> <openmrs:hasPrivilege privilege="Patient Dashboard - View Graphs >>> Section"> >>> <openmrs:hasPrivilege privilege="Form Entry"> >>> >>> >>> However looking at patientOverview.jsp I see we refer to the underlying >>> API-level privileges: >>> >>> <openmrs:hasPrivilege privilege="View Patient Programs"> >>> <openmrs:hasPrivilege privilege="View Relationships"> >>> <openmrs:hasPrivilege privilege="View Allergies"> >>> <openmrs:hasPrivilege privilege="View Problems"> >>> >>> >>> Seems like we should write a ticket to: >>> >>> 1. introduce new privileges like "Patient Overview - View Programs >>> Section", etc >>> 2. use those in all dashboard portlets rather than the API >>> counterparts >>> 3. do a liquibase changeset so that every role that has "View >>> Patient Programs" also gets "Patient Overview - View Programs Section", >>> etc. (That way nobody loses the ability to see something they currently >>> see.) >>> >>> Dave, would that help? >>> >>> Daniel, want to do this? >>> >>> -Darius >>> >>> >>> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 2:33 PM, Dave Thomas <pihd...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Burke, sorry for not being clear before. I think what you said in #1 >>>> is pretty much what i'm asking for. >>>> >>>> The terminology can be worked out (to use your example 'Access' could >>>> imply API-level privileges, and 'View' could imply app-level privileges), >>>> but the important thing to me would be to not have 'Access Patient Data' >>>> sometimes be applied at the API level and sometimes applied at the app >>>> level. With 'Access Patient Data' used at both the API and app layers, if >>>> I restrict 'Access Patient Data' for a user, it is incredibly difficult to >>>> tell what i've actually restricted. This is when pieces of the >>>> application, other than the one I was trying to restrict, start throwing >>>> errors unexpectedly (per mark's example). >>>> >>>> Part two of this argument (and maybe this is a different discussion) >>>> would be that once there was a clear distinction between api and app level >>>> privileges, the app level privileges could start to reflect actual UI >>>> components a little more. If each portlet on the patient dashboard had its >>>> own privilege for example, like 'view regimen tab', the UI would be a LOT >>>> more easy to customise in a meaningful way using privileges and roles. >>>> >>>> d >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Burke Mamlin >>>> <bmam...@regenstrief.org>wrote: >>>> >>>>> Mark, >>>>> >>>>> This is an interesting point. Your example helps me understand Dave's >>>>> point and suggests that we should distinguish between "Access Patient >>>>> Data" >>>>> and "View Patient Data" – i.e., the use of "View" in the privilege term >>>>> describing API-level access to data per our conventions implies that >>>>> getting data at the API level also means that the user should be able to >>>>> view it within the application, which is not always the case. In your >>>>> example (a person being able to view aggregate patient data without >>>>> viewing >>>>> individual patient records), we have two choices: >>>>> >>>>> 1. Grant the user "Access Patient Data" as the API-level >>>>> privilege, meaning that they would be permitted to execute API calls >>>>> that >>>>> return patient information, but would not imply that the application >>>>> should >>>>> let them view the data directly. >>>>> >>>>> 2. Allow the methods that need to access patient data to proxy >>>>> privileges for the user. >>>>> >>>>> The first seems like the better option to me. Proxying privileges >>>>> seems like a hacky way to override privileges that are there for a reason. >>>>> The first option will take some effort (maybe more than the upcoming >>>>> sprint can muster), but seems like a better long-term solution. Maybe we >>>>> can come up with a way to start heading that direction. >>>>> >>>>> -Burke >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 3:55 PM, Mark Goodrich <mgoodr...@pih.org>wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> +1 for this. We’ve run into issues with this a lot. For instance, >>>>>> say you have a user who should not be able to view patients, but should >>>>>> have access to a report of aggregate patient data that calls >>>>>> getPatients() >>>>>> behind the scenes to perform the necessary calculations. If you take >>>>>> away >>>>>> the “view patient” privilege from the user, they’ll get a stack trace >>>>>> when >>>>>> they attempt to execute the report.**** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> >>>>>> This issue has been prevalent enough for us that we basically are >>>>>> unable to use privileges and roles for access control … **** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> >>>>>> Mark**** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> >>>>>> *From:* dev@openmrs.org [mailto:dev@openmrs.org] *On Behalf Of *Dave >>>>>> Thomas >>>>>> *Sent:* Wednesday, May 09, 2012 2:51 PM >>>>>> *To:* openmrs-deve...@listserv.iupui.edu >>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [OPENMRS-DEV] Roles and Privileges Sprint**** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> >>>>>> If i can weigh in on a discussion of roles and privileges briefly, >>>>>> I've found (and maybe things are improved in versions greater than 1.6.x) >>>>>> that we've run into trouble when a privilege is used both at the api and >>>>>> web layer. This happens when we want to hide something in the UI that is >>>>>> wrapped in a <privilege/> tag, but then when we remove that privilege >>>>>> for a >>>>>> user, it turns out that the same privilege was wrapped around a couple of >>>>>> API methods, causing unexpected and hard-to-track-down UI problems across >>>>>> all of openmrs. >>>>>> >>>>>> If there's a dedicated pass at roles+privileges, has there been any >>>>>> thought to separating api privileges from ui privileges? I kind of feel >>>>>> like this is low-hanging fruit. This wouldn't even need re-architecting, >>>>>> maybe just privilege naming conventions? >>>>>> >>>>>> Or is the general sense that this type of problem has disappeared in >>>>>> newer versions? >>>>>> >>>>>> d**** >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 10:29 AM, Burke Mamlin <bu...@openmrs.org> >>>>>> wrote:**** >>>>>> >>>>>> (bringing this conversation about preparing for the Roles & >>>>>> Privileges sprint onto the dev list)**** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> >>>>>> Reviewing the notes <http://notes.openmrs.org/2012-roadmap> on Roles >>>>>> & Permissions section from Jembi & PIH, it looks like there are some >>>>>> fundamental improvements requested:**** >>>>>> >>>>>> - Ship OpenMRS with pre-defined roles**** >>>>>> - Better documentation on managing roles (avoiding pitfalls)**** >>>>>> - More informative handling of privilege exceptions (make it >>>>>> easier to understand where/which privileges are missing)**** >>>>>> - Data-level permissions (restricting access to specific data >>>>>> based on privileges)**** >>>>>> >>>>>> We've had prior conversations about improving roles/privileges:**** >>>>>> >>>>>> - Avoiding the common pitfall of conflating organizational roles >>>>>> (job title) with application roles (authorization within OpenMRS); >>>>>> they may >>>>>> align early on in simple systems, but exceptions are common over time >>>>>> or as >>>>>> a a system grows.**** >>>>>> - Creating privilege groups vs. programmatically defined roles – >>>>>> e.g., a web page wants to limit access to those who have a set of >>>>>> privileges.**** >>>>>> - Introducing location-based privileges**** >>>>>> >>>>>> There seem to be some potential short-term wins that could be done in >>>>>> the sprint:**** >>>>>> >>>>>> - Improve our documentation to better introduce people to roles & >>>>>> privileges and cover the common pitfalls.**** >>>>>> - Improve privilege error messages in core and/or create a module >>>>>> that makes it easier to troubleshoot privilege errors (e.g., log all >>>>>> privilege checks during an operation and present the unique list of >>>>>> privileges and/or roles that would cover the operation, allowing >>>>>> someone to >>>>>> step through a workflow as superuser and then see the list of >>>>>> privileges >>>>>> required to complete the workflow).**** >>>>>> - Come up with some basic application roles that can be >>>>>> pre-defined within OpenMRS (ship with the application)**** >>>>>> - Design (and, if possible, implement) an approach for privilege >>>>>> groups or system roles (i.e., uneditable sets of privileges that >>>>>> applications can program against)**** >>>>>> >>>>>> Data-level privileges (limiting access to data based on privileges) >>>>>> would be a terrific addition, but I'm afraid it will take more design >>>>>> that >>>>>> we can muster between now & the beginning of this sprint. Maybe we could >>>>>> come up with some small but useful first attempts at solving this problem >>>>>> (e.g., a module requiring permissions to access certain observations … >>>>>> or a >>>>>> module that limits access to specific patients based on permissions). >>>>>> **** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> >>>>>> Cheers,**** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> >>>>>> -Burke**** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 9:49 AM, Burke Mamlin <bu...@openmrs.org> >>>>>> wrote:**** >>>>>> >>>>>> Looking back at notes from AMPATH, the only reference to anything >>>>>> close to roles & privileges I found was the desire for the Data Entry >>>>>> Statistics Module to have a basic view privilege that allows a data >>>>>> assistant to see only his/her own statistics.**** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> >>>>>> -Burke**** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 9:44 AM, Ben Wolfe <b...@openmrs.org> wrote:*** >>>>>> * >>>>>> >>>>>> Dawn found this link for me: >>>>>> http://notes.openmrs.org/2012-roadmap >>>>>> >>>>>> Is has the (mostly raw) notes from the calls we had with >>>>>> Jembi/PIH/AMPATH. >>>>>> >>>>>> Daniel, can you tease out the topics from that and the other text >>>>>> below in the next 4 hours? >>>>>> >>>>>> Ben**** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>> >>>>>> Click here to >>>>>> unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from >>>>>> OpenMRS Developers' mailing list >>>>>> **** >>>>>> >>>>>> ** ** >>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>> >>>>>> Click here to >>>>>> unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from >>>>>> OpenMRS Developers' mailing list >>>>>> **** >>>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>>> Click here to >>>>>> unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from >>>>>> OpenMRS Developers' mailing list >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>> Click here to >>>>> unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from >>>>> OpenMRS Developers' mailing list >>>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------ >>>> Click here to >>>> unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from >>>> OpenMRS Developers' mailing list >>>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> Click here to >>> unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from >>> OpenMRS Developers' mailing list >>> >> >> ------------------------------ >> Click here to >> unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from >> OpenMRS Developers' mailing list >> > > ------------------------------ > Click here to > unsubscribe<lists...@listserv.iupui.edu?body=SIGNOFF%20openmrs-devel-l>from > OpenMRS Developers' mailing list > _________________________________________ To unsubscribe from OpenMRS Developers' mailing list, send an e-mail to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with "SIGNOFF openmrs-devel-l" in the body (not the subject) of your e-mail. 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