Nico Kadel-Garcia wrote: > On Fri, Jun 15, 2018 at 12:55 PM, Till Maas <opensou...@till.name> wrote: > > So the assumption is to have a super sophisticated browser exploit for which > > an attacker most likely spent several days to find it and then the PATH > > setting will make it so much harder that the exploit will not succeed? There > > are a lot more real challenges that attackers have to face. > > No "browser" sophistication is necessary. The replacement of default > system utilities by anyone who write into that private but > semi-concealed $HOME/.local/bin/
And how did the attacker acquire write access to $HOME/.local/bin/ in the first place? Do you know of a way to do that so easily that appending a line to one of the shell startup files seems sophisticated in comparison? I don't much like the proposed change to PATH, but I'm getting *really* sick of all the security by handwaving that's going on in this thread. Could everybody please discuss *relevant* attack scenarios, instead of scenarios that begin with the attacker already having so much access that the value of PATH doesn't matter? Björn Persson
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