Ben Cotton wrote:
> ** Maintain the following patch sets for the Linux kernel, and
> possibly have them accepted in the upstream kernel:
> ***
> [//lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210409114313.4073-1-
roberto.sa...@huawei.com/
> IMA execution policies] ***
> [//lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210914163401.864635-1-
roberto.sa...@huawei.com/
> DIGLIM basic features] ***
> [//lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210915163145.1046505-1-
roberto.sa...@huawei.com/
> DIGLIM advanced features] ***
> [//lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210930115533.878169-1-
roberto.sa...@huawei.com/
> DIGLIM integration with IMA] ***
> [//lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20181112102423.30415-1-
roberto.sa...@huawei.com/
> PGP keys and signatures]
Can we trust the security code submitted by a Huawei employee to not contain
hidden government-developed backdoors? (Basically the same question as for
the existing NSA SELinux code…)
Kevin Kofler
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