Once upon a time, Sharpened Blade <sharpenedbl...@proton.me> said: > With virtual machines, nothing can actually be verified completely, the host > running the vm can, 1) Modify the firmware to intercept anything the attacker > wants, or 2) directly intercept things at the cpu level.
There are CPU extensions that I understand stop that, so that the hypervisor and VMs do not have to trust each other. That's part of the reason to secure the boot stack. -- Chris Adams <li...@cmadams.net> _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@lists.fedoraproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to devel-le...@lists.fedoraproject.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fedoraproject.org Do not reply to spam on the list, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure
