Hi Michael, > On 5. Jan 2026, at 23:13, Michael J Gruber <[email protected]> wrote: > > Why oh why? > > I mean, I'm all for replacing gnupg by something better. But why is RH > deliberately chosing key types which force sequoia adoption?
As far as I know, GnuPG does not yet have support for PQC signatures. There’s code in libgcrypt, but none in GnuPG yet from what I can see. The keys RH ships are ML-DSA-87+Ed448 following https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc-16, so it’s not like we’ve entirely cooked up our own thing here — other implementations that understand those keys exist, and GnuPG is free to implement support as well. Regulatory requirements force us to roll out PQC signing; this seemed to be the best path forward. Note that you should not need to interact with this key at all — it should all be transparently be handled for you by RPM and its rpm-sequoia integration. That being said, there are a few minor issues (e.g., there’s an Ansible system role that uses GnuPG to obtain a list of key IDs from a given OpenPGP public key file to check whether they have been imported into the RPM database) that we are addressing as we are discovering them. > I'm sorry to say, but that's another display of the attitude around the > sequoia project which keeps at least some people from embracing it. What does the Sequoia project have to do with a decision made by Red Hat to use it? You seem to be mixing things up here. None of the above affects Fedora, btw. That being said, I was planning to propose a system-wide change to use the same setup in Fedora eventually, although not before the draft I linked above becomes a standard (which we’re hoping will happen this year). And even then, a change like that won’t land quickly given that a lot of Fedora infrastructure around signing would have to change with it. RPM v6 allows multiple signatures on a single RPM, so the classic RSA signatures are still there, and will continue to stay. Only clients that understand both RPM v6 and OpenPGP v6 would even verify the PQC signature and therefore get security against quantum computers. -- Clemens Lang RHEL Crypto Team Red Hat -- _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected] Do not reply to spam, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure/new_issue
