On Tuesday, July 7th, 2026 at 12:56, Michael Catanzaro via devel <[email protected]> wrote:
> The security warning is hidden in the COMMANDS section of the man page, under > the "default" command. I realized that this section is on *some* manpages, but it is not on all manpages (Ubuntu's hasn't been updated since 2006, it seems). https://manpages.debian.org/trixie/xdg-utils/xdg-mime.1.en.html https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/trusty/man1/xdg-mime.1.html https://linux.die.net/man/1/xdg-mime There isn't any possible way that the Wine developers could've anticipated that portals would be used in this manner by Flatpak, Snap, WebKitGTK, Etc... Again, I don't know what's supposed to be expected out of making the decision to allow unrestricted portals from within a sandboxed application. Open source developers don't appreciate being drive-by'ed like this. I believe that the Wine developers would like to know why these decisions were made by the sandbox application frameworks, at the very least, and perhaps the person who made them, as well. If they know *that,* maybe they'll be nice, and add a fix? Pushing the burden of security onto unsuspecting application developers isn't a responsible thing to do. Blaming the Wine developers for not anticipating that they would have this burden placed upon them, is also irresponsible. I'd rather have sandbox developers (and also DE developers, if applicable) take this kind of thing seriously, and *restrict* portals, so that application developers, like Wine, don't accidentally introduce edge-case security holes in the future, due to "random execution thing X," which could've been completely avoided if these systems (or sandboxes, in this case) were built properly in the first place. Sandboxes are supposed to be built for security. The burden of security should be placed on the sandbox developer. They should be expected to be responsible for the security of their sandboxes, not the Wine developers (or any other random application developer that might run/execute scripts & binaries). Sent with Proton Mail secure email. > Keep in mind the portals are used not only by Flatpak, but also snap and > WebKitGTK. > > The portal *could* choose to require user interaction before launching a > file, but probably users will just click Allow and lose, so that doesn't seem > like a great solution. Also, that would likely become seriously annoying > pretty quickly. > -- _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected] Do not reply to spam, report it: https://forge.fedoraproject.org/infra/tickets/issues/new
