On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 12:57 PM, Michael Stone <mich...@laptop.org> wrote:
> I'm not clear why Sugar needs more protection from rogue activities than a >> normal desktop environment has from rogue applications. >> > > The justification which interests me the most goes something like: "strong > protections mean that there is less risk that kids and teachers will break > things by installing software on their machines; therefore, educational > innovations will spread faster." See my comment regarding Backup, a far more useful and achievable solution to this problem. > Reinventing the desktop as a constructivist learning environment is a big >> enough task for one development team / community to swallow. Reinventing >> security is an altogether separate cause. >> > > There is no reinvention taking place here; instead, we are using both > long-standing OS features (discretionary access control; memory isolation) > and > novel OS features (network containerization, cgroup-based memory resource > limits) in new combinations as they become available. What has changed is > that > the Sugar UI and user expectations permit concentrated use of these > features. In a nutshell, all this refers to Sandboxing, which seems to be the "new hotness" in software security these days. I type this email in Google Chrome, which is a good example of that. There's nothing wrong with sandboxing or other new security techniques, I just argue that their purpose is *orthogonal* to the goals of Sugar. Apologies for incorrectly assuming that you wanted someone to finish Rainbow. As far as I know the current implementation is without major issues, if some of the more advanced features of Bitfrost are not yet implemented. Regards, -Wade
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