--- Jim Dixon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Wed, 12 Nov 2003, [iso-8859-1] Some Guy wrote: > > Here's a neat paper Zooko (the MNet guy) pointed out: > > http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/douceur02sybil.html They argue you'd need a > > central authority to prevent a sybil attack. I think they're wrong. > > The author's claim is negative: he proves that given a reasonable set of > assumptions, it is impossible for a large network without a certification > authority to prevent a single attacker from successfully masquerading as a > number of users. Once one or more attackers have done so, they can then > expand their foothold by endorsing one another as well as other new > attackers. > > His analysis applies to any large-scale p2p network. There are at least > two defenses: either create some sort of certification authority (perhaps > a supervisory p2p network) or allow/encourage fragmentation of the target > network.
Lemma 1 says pretty much, an adversary can be limited by his resources. That's pretty much the way to go. Then we can hopefully assume most nodes are run by the "good guys". It suggests some strategies for doing this. I've got one of my own, kind of mixuture of CPU and mostly hard drive space. I could write it up an post it, but I think the list is a bit tired of this problem. __________________________________________________________________ Gesendet von Yahoo! Mail - http://mail.yahoo.de Logos und Klingelt�ne f�rs Handy bei http://sms.yahoo.de _______________________________________________ Devl mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
