On Sun, 2003-11-30 at 13:33, Thomas Leske wrote: > Martin Stone Davis wrote: > > What bad thing would a malicious node operator do with that > > knowledge? > > He could censor a certain document. Assume he has the resources to > lauch a denail of service attack against a limited number of nodes. If he > does not know, which nodes to attack, he will be out of luck. > > When the nodes that specialized around the key to be censored are taken > down, it will be pure chance to find the data unless it was already very > popular before. >
This problem is of course an argument for re-inserting data under a different key: just append some salt to the file and reinsert it. You still need to distribute the new key, but that is no harder than it was to distribute the original key. It also gets around the problem of re-insertion failing to keep data stored where the network looks for it. And it gets around key based censorship in general. -- Ed Huff
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