Edgar Friendly wrote:
I was re-reading the paper "Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and
Solid-State Memory"[1], and this section caught my attention.
The most practical solution to the problem of DRAM data retention is
therefore to constantly flip the bits in memory to ensure that a
memory cell never holds a charge long enough for it to be
"remembered". While not practical for general use, it is possible to
do this for small amounts of very sensitive data such as encryption
keys. This is particularly advisable where keys are stored in the
same memory location for long periods of time and control access to
large amounts of information, such as keys used for transparent
encryption of files on disk drives. The bit-flipping also has the
convenient side-effect of keeping the page containing the encryption
keys at the top of the queue maintained by the system's paging
mechanism, greatly reducing the chances of it being paged to disk at
some point.
Don't put this any higher than very low priority, but a non-toad could
do this easily. I just wanted it in the list archives before I forgot
about it.
Thelema
[1] http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html
Well, if we are getting paranoid already. How about rather than deleting temp files/blocks
from the datastore we allow to move them to another directory on the same hard disk. Then
the scheduled task can be set up to wipe those files.
- Volodya
--
Hi! I am a .SIG virus! Copy me to your SIG so that I can spread!
http://freedom.libsyn.com/ Voice of Freedom, Radical Podcast
http://www.whengendarmesleeps.org/ When Gendarme Sleeps, Anarchy's Zine of
Poetry
========================
"None of us are free until all of us are free."
~ Mihail Bakunin
_______________________________________________
Devl mailing list
[email protected]
http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
