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> [ snip long security argument ]
>
> PROPOSAL:
> We can improve security against a distant, moderately powerful attacker doing
> a key-based search by never starting to insert a layer of the splitfile
> pyramid until the layer below has been *completely* inserted, not just made
> fetchable. We should also put dire warnings on the EarlyEncode option.
Sorry if i misunderstand something, but isn't that truly only a problem with
Promiscuous nodes? If you are on
true darknet will you really be more vulnerable if you announce the key in
advance?
If i'm right then it would be more beneficial to only allow the node to calc
the key in advance when
Promiscuous is off, which will also give people more reasons to switch.
- VolodyA! V A
- --
http://freedom.libsyn.com/ Voice of Freedom, Radical Podcast
http://eng.anarchopedia.org/ Anarchopedia, A Free Knowledge Portal
"None of us are free until all of us are free." ~ Mihail Bakunin
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