On Thursday 03 January 2008 01:35, Michael Rogers wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > No, but it would make the request time variance much higher, especially for > > inserts and unsuccessful requests (which can potentially visit the entire > > network). > > True, the variance would be higher. Visiting the entire network is a bit > of an extreme example though - in theory it's also possible with the > current hop counter, but it's not exactly likely. :-) > > > A lot more requests will naturally timeout than do now, and therefore a node > > can silently drop a request without arousing much concern or suspicion. Per > > node failure tables can't reroute that key until the timeout happens, and if > > the timeout is larger than it is now, that takes longer. > > We're using a reliable transport between nodes, so the only things that > should cause a timeout are overloaded, crashed or faulty nodes.
Not true. Very long paths can also cause this. > If we > can keep the ping time under control then we can detect crashed nodes > quickly. So with proper load management we should be able to pretty much > eliminate timeouts except in the case of faulty nodes, which can then be > detected. Not with probabilistic termination. > > >> I shouldn't have said we can't analyse it, but I wouldn't know where to > >> start because so much depends on the topology. For example, the > >> closest-location-so-far obviously leaks information, but how do we > >> quantify it? > > > > Isn't it similar to the situation with keys? > > Sorry, I don't follow. > > The closest-location-so-far tells an attacker something about the path a > request has followed - among other things, it allows the attacker to > rule out certain nodes the request definitely hasn't passed through. But > how would we quantify that in terms of the size of the initiator's > anonymity set or the probability that a given node is the initiator, for > example? Well, how does the attacker rule out previous nodes? How many can he rule out? > > Whereas with a weighted coin, if the probability that each node > terminates the request is 1/n then there's a 1/n chance that the > previous hop is the initiator. > > Cheers, > Michael
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