On Jan 31, 2008, at 11:57 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:
(This is a different attacker from the one that wants to occupy a
region of
the key space, BTW - this one's goal is to make you search a large
number
of nonexistent subnets before giving up, and possibly to stop you
discovering real subnets by flooding your routing table.)
I suppose what would be necessary, then is that a node only forward
(or.. advertise) network id's from the top-'N'-succeeding networks.
That would isolate the flood to the attacker's peers, and concentrate
the spread of useful (big) network id's for routing.
--
Robert Hailey
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