On Feb 1, 2008, at 11:57 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote:
I'm not familiar enough with the details of the proposed ULPRs and
how
USKs and Frost and the like check for new updates / messages, but it
seems possible that simple legitimate checks for new content would
have a similar effect. Of course, failure tables would help a lot
with that case, but they wouldn't help against a malicious attacker.
Could ULPRs help to resolve it? Would it be possible to estimate the
demand
for a key (in a way which doesn't favour single nodes that constantly
rerequest, and is biased by links so that an attacker could only
attack
proportionately to the number of connections he has), in order to
decide
which requests to let through?
I guess you could add to the failure table which distinct links have
requested a given key, and be more likely to let those through with
more links (once the failure is timed out). It doesn't seem very
granular, as I would suppose (in a small world network) that a re-
request from a non-peer node would be very likely to show up on a
different connection.
--
Robert Hailey
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