A paper accepted by INFOCOM 2013 claims to: 1) Show that our view of Kleinberg is unrealistic because we do not have the sideways lattice links - the closest connection to the target isn't always closer to the target than we've been so far. 2) Prove that we can't have polylog routing, and show that perverse cases where the best route will take us further away are increasingly common as networks grow, and 3) Propose a new algorithm that is provably polylog. http://www.p2p.tu-darmstadt.de/publications/details/?no_cache=1&tx_bibtex_pi1[pub_id]=TUD-CS-2013-0036 ("A Contribution to Analyzing and Enhancing Darknet Routing", Roos & Strufe)
Performance simulations show it is similar to ours or better depending on the properties of the network, via a parameter C, "the maximal distance to the closest neighbor over all nodes", i.e. if our closest links are close enough, our current algorithm should work, but if not, their version is significantly faster. The new algorithm changes backtracking and keeps a list of marked nodes - all nodes visited AFAICS, or at least nodes where it backtracked. Obviously this has security implications, but on darknet this is less important than on opennet, and we really should have a separate tunnel setup system for the very paranoid (e.g. based on Pisces). Having said that: - All the topologies simulated showed acceptable HTL for a 100,000 node network, even using our current simplistic algorithm. Granted that's somewhat idealized... - We can use redundancy to some degree to avoid perverse parts of the keyspace breaking important functionality. I've suspected that "perverse parts of the keyspace" exist for some time, and that seems to be the paper's main concern; and it does not solve the problem either, it merely limits it. - Right now hardly anyone uses darknet, and Michael Grube still hasn't finished dealing with Pitch Black. His homepage also has some rather vague ideas under "open theses" on censorship attacks on opennet via flooding; I suspect this was written by his supervisor who may not have investigated the matter fully. IMHO flooding opennet is a rather expensive attack, it's probably much easier to MAST your target and take them offline IRL! :) http://www.p2p.tu-darmstadt.de/people/stefanie-roos/
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