Likely because other non-Tor-specific attacks (staining, pwning) that are mentioned, are way easier.
They are probably working on it, though. Data centre in Utah, anyone? On 05/10/13 07:20, Jack Singleton wrote: > Interesting that there is no mention of timing attacks... > > You would think with the amount of monitoring they are doing that it would > be fairly simple to correlate traffic being sent to tor nodes with traffic > leaving exit nodes. > > > On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 1:34 PM, Ian Clarke <i...@freenetproject.org> wrote: > >> This is very interesting: >> >> >> http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity >> >> Looks like it's not an attack on Tor itself, rather they identify Tor users >> (which Tor isn't designed to prevent AFAIK), and then do a MITM on the >> connection between Tor and the web to insert some code that exploits a >> vulnerability that (until recently) was distributed as part of the Tor >> bundle. >> >> Seem like, even though this Firefox vulnerability has been fixed, that they >> probably have a library of other ones to choose from. >> >> Ian. >> >> -- >> Ian Clarke >> Founder, The Freenet Project >> Email: i...@freenetproject.org >> _______________________________________________ >> Devl mailing list >> Devl@freenetproject.org >> https://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl >> > _______________________________________________ > Devl mailing list > Devl@freenetproject.org > https://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl > -- GPG: 4096R/1318EFAC5FBBDBCE git://github.com/infinity0/pubkeys.git _______________________________________________ Devl mailing list Devl@freenetproject.org https://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
