On 03/12/14 03:46, Steve Dougherty wrote: > On 11/14/2014 07:18 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote: >> On 14/11/14 03:51, Steve Dougherty wrote: >>> On Nov 5, 2014 7:04 AM, "Matthew Toseland" <mj...@cam.ac.uk> wrote: >>>> On 05/11/14 04:37, Steve Dougherty wrote: > ... >>>>> Also update.sh|cmd contain what are effectively shell / batch script >>>>> reimplementations of parts of the Node updater. Would anyone be >>>>> interested in breaking out the deployment part so that both scripts can >>>>> call the node jar with a main class that will fetch over HTTPS, then >>>>> deployment proceeds as usual? Verification is currently sha1; is knowing >>>>> the key alone (like from dependencies.properties) enough to know the >>>>> file's checksum? If we switch to verify signatures how should we ship >>>>> keys? >>>> IMHO update.sh / update.cmd should work even if e.g. we have somehow >>>> managed to corrupt the node jar, e.g. it's 0 bytes long, wrapper.conf is >>>> broken, etc. They are supposed to be for last-resort recovery, so users >>>> don't need to reinstall. >>> Unless we suspect that there are either updater bugs or common system >>> failures that lead to zero-byte jars, I'm not convinced it's worth the >>> additional maintenance burden and additional opportunities to introduce >>> bugs. If we move the updater into the jar it could repair the >>> wrapper.conf when invoked from a script. (or directly) >> This has happened lots of times before. IMHO it is common, and being >> able to recover without doing a full reinstall is a useful feature, >> especially if we want people to use darknet. > I have not been able to find bugs filed about this. Do you have anything > that might be useful in reproducing the problem? It's possible that this is an archaic problem that doesn't happen any more. Certainly the scripts themselves could create this situation sometimes, and/or the headless installer.
Also, do we really want the node itself to have the functionality to fetch the binaries over HTTPS? It's a gross hack that should not be used except in an emergency, does it belong in Fred?
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