On Mon, 2015-11-30 at 15:29 +0000, Matthew Toseland wrote:
> We have several major problems:
> 1. We need a major injection of cash.
> 2. We will not have a big connected darknet any time soon.
> 3. Opennet is not secure unless users pay for introduction.
> 4. Opennet is slow because of lowest common denominator load.
> 
> I propose: Freenet Rebooted.
> 
> A Kickstarter, but based on extending the current code, not a full
> rewrite. A lot of it actually works reasonably well.
> 
> MAJOR CHANGES:
> 1. Darknet enhancements, but we recognise that we will need a large,
> fast opennet backbone to connect the darknet pockets for the time
> being.
> 2. You can only run a Full Opennet Node if you have an Opennet Invite
> and meet bandwidth/performance requirements.
> 3. Only Full Opennet Nodes route tunnels and/or high HTL traffic.
> 4. There may be further restrictions for security reasons, if so we
> will
> ensure that an OI still gives performance benefits (even if you are
> not
> routing traffic).
> 5. Opennet tunnels via ShadowWalker.
> 6. Better seednodes.
> 7. Most of the enhancements to other areas we've previously
> discussed.
> 8. Transient mode reintroduced, so opennet Freenet is still free as
> in
> beer, and secure with tunnels. Great for uploading on the run! But
> transient nodes don't route traffic/tunnels and get lower
> performance.
> 9. Investigate hardware partners and home-server UI issues. Long term
> we
> need cheap, convenient hardware nodes, because we need uptime.
> 
> Initially we aim to raise $1M. Anyone who donates $100 gets an
> Opennet
> Invite, so this is 10,000 users. Hardware nodes might be a good donor
> perk too. In future we anticipate charging for OI's, but expect an
> increasing proportion to be provably given to other worthwhile,
> respected and relevant charities e.g. EFF: The price paid to become
> part
> of the network infrastructure is mainly a deterrent to large scale
> attacks, rather than a means of raising revenue.
> 
> Thoughts?
> 

This assumes that Sybil is the only attack against opennet... which is
clearly misleading. Sybil is the obvious, cheap attack; the nastier
ones are all those related to "open" topologies and protocols:
partitioning attacks, correlation attacks, ... for which we don't have
solutions either.

Florent

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