On Sat, Nov 09, 2002 at 02:25:54PM -0800, thirty at hushmail.com wrote: <> > Lastly, it's nice to read some moderately positive reaction. > Now if only you had commit privleges... :)
No, this is not going in, unless it is going to be forced over my kicking and screaming objections. There are three important reasons: 1) The effect on the opaqueness of the network is real. The network already reveals things when data is requested, but we try to keep it at the minimal necessary level for keeping accurate routing. I'm sure that one could try to patch over each specific example by making the behavior more and more complicated, but it betrays the general principle. And note that this problem is not resolved by making the feature voluntary - opaqueness is a global quality that effects everyone. 2) Other networks do this better. If you want to protect requester anonymity for requests to unsafe resources, then there are systems that are a lot better at it then freenet. A "Crowds" system, for instance, does not have routing and HTL values that betray nodes that start requests to others as we do. I believe that cDc's "peekabooty" system is a Crowds implementation, perhaps you ought to look at that. Mixnet systems are safer still. 3) Probably most importantly, it undermines the real goals of this project. Security and privacy for the publisher is just as great a part of our goals as requester privacy, and encouraging freenet to be used just as a proxy rather than an information storage network is going back on that goal. I, for one, have not given up hope that we can make freenet work at what it actually is. You should have discussed the issue here before you implemented this. This idea is not new, so you would have had the same response right away, and could have saved yourself the time and effort. -- Oskar Sandberg oskar at freenetproject.org _______________________________________________ devl mailing list devl at freenetproject.org http://hawk.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
