On Jan 30, 2008, at 9:24 AM, Michael Rogers wrote:

> On Jan 28 2008, Robert Hailey wrote:
>> Inside China (in this case)
>> there would be a viable freenet, and outside there would be a viable
>> freenet but due to the few connections between them, keys could not  
>> be
>> effectively fetched or put one to the other.
>
> Unfortunately even if we can solve this problem in the accidental  
> case (by
> using networks IDs for example), I don't see how we can solve it in  
> the
> deliberate case: someone creates a chain of Sybil nodes that  
> occupies a
> large region of the key space, so the attacker controls all traffic  
> in and
> out of that region.
>
> There only need to be two connections between the Sybil chain and the
> outside world to keep the chain from collapsing into a point, so the  
> attack
> will work even in a pure darknet as long as there are at least two  
> gullible
> users. And the Sybil nodes don't even need to misbehave - they can  
> swap
> normally and respond normally to requests, but the small bandwidth  
> between
> the Sybil region and the rest of the network will make that region  
> of the
> key space effectively useless.

I'm not sure I understand your point. Isn't that *exactly* what we  
would want to happen? The two peers on the ends recognize that  
subnetwork inconsistency and route less/none into it (unless, as  
Matthew was saying, it fails in the current network). To the best of  
my knowledge, outside of the subnet, the other properly-connected  
nodes can (and will) have the same keyspace/location; that is what  
makes them routing obstacles (location=0.545... in US-freenet, or  
China-freenet?).

If DNFs (or more likely, lack of successes) is used as an evidence of  
a dungeon (which I am not presently suggesting, as it's a feedback  
loop), this would also be a way of dealing with malicious DNF'ing  
nodes as they are eventually isolated into there own network (seen as  
there own dungeon by that node's peers).

--
Robert Hailey

> And of course if there are only two connections to the outside  
> world, the
> attacker only really needs two nodes: the rest of the chain can just  
> be
> simulated.
>
> Cheers,
> Michael

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