On Jan 30 2008, Robert Hailey wrote: >The two peers on the ends recognize that >subnetwork inconsistency and route less/none into it (unless, as >Matthew was saying, it fails in the current network).
But how do they decide to route around it? Any scheme based on collectively-agreed network IDs would require the attacker's cooperation, wouldn't it? As you say, it might be possible to use the fraction of DNFs to detect dungeons, but then an attacker could request nonexistent keys from a particular range to make that part of the network look like a dungeon. >To the best of >my knowledge, outside of the subnet, the other properly-connected >nodes can (and will) have the same keyspace/location; that is what >makes them routing obstacles (location=0.545... in US-freenet, or >China-freenet?). Right, so what happens if the nodes in China-freenet insist they're part of US-freenet? Cheers, Michael
