On Apr 22, 2009, at 9:03 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote: > Argh, no, this doesn't work, because the pubkey is known, and there > is no way > for the node to verify that the content is in fact valid. An > attacker can not > only cause collisions, he can preemptively block known content by > inserting > bogus data to where it would be posted.
Why doesn't it work? If we are inserting a CMK and (when we get to the top block) find that the ssk is full of garbage (or potentially a hash-equivalent file), why can't we add a magic one to the top block to change the hash and iterate? -- Robert Hailey -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20090430/2260ff1d/attachment.html>
