On Monday 29 June 2009 17:03:56 Gregory Maxwell wrote: > On Fri, Jun 19, 2009 at 12:37 PM, Robert > Hailey<robert at freenetproject.org> wrote: > > What about an evil peer sending a "full" filter to try and collect all > > traffic? Have we discussed that? > > Might it be reasonable to weigh the selection with the selectivity of > the filter? > > I.e. weight = 1.0/(abs(number_of_ones_in_filter - number_of_zeros_in_filter)) > > (or, instead, weighing by the ones density compared to other peers?) > > Regardless of the security properties, some kind of density based > weighing is probably be desirable in terms of traffic balancing to > avoid nodes with dense filters capturing too much of the traffic.
IMHO our current defense (prevent any node from getting more than 30% of outgoing traffic) is adequate, probably combined with an attempt to identify when a node is unable to send the key it advertised. Bloom filters are not the only way to get more hits from a peer, look at FOAF. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 835 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20090629/612ec6e2/attachment.pgp>
