On 2011/05/13 (May), at 6:02 PM, Matthew Toseland wrote: > In any case, our options appear to be: > > 1) Try to make opennet work in China. > ... > > We could try to rotate links even, so that only a few nodes have > external connections at a time. The catch is that we don't know what > the limit above is, and it will probably vary from time to time. So > this is probably a dead-end.
We would also need to be able to distinguish between a local & foreign node. For a single case (like China) that could work, but the general case would be rather difficult to code up (detecting censorship boundaries: national or ISP...). Link latency *might* be clue enough for national boundaries, but not blocking ISPs. > > 2) Focus on darknet. > ... > Difficulties: > a) If the Chinese darknet is completely sealed off from the western > network, how would they even get software updates? We need better > tools for migrating binary blobs. > b) We need some way to ensure that FOAF connections don't result in > dangerous external connections. Wether open or dark, if a connection crosses the firewall border it is susceptible. If not dodging under the foreign bandwidth cap (as you mentioned), then the only issue is what to do with the few (if any) unfiltered connections. There is a chance that an algorithm which is both aware of 'separate networks' and optimizes for latency would keep most of the traffic within national borders (the firewall surely introduces some latency by itself), and make it a non-issue. One might predict the next iteration would block protocols not on a whitelist. -- Robert Hailey -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20110517/75dc1ede/attachment.html>
