"Dr. Arne Babenhauserheide" <arne_...@web.de> writes: > - New nodes in the network will not receive any local requests, so they > will only route half as many HTL18 requests. A new node will therefore > have not only half the anonymity set against an attacker, but also > only half the cover traffic.
Also the HTL18 requests that new nodes do receive will be more specific to their location, so they might be distinguishable from their local requests. Thoughts: - Initial random routing could solve that problem (see https://github.com/freenet/fred/pull/529 ), but initial random routing actually makes correlation attacks easier, because it removes the requirement to know the FOAFs to do the statistics. Knowing all the CHKs for a given file would be a more powerful attack. - Reducing the probability to decrement HTL18 could increase the cover traffic again — 75% to forward HTL18 unchanged would balance this change. To avoid increasing the average distance from senders, that might require reducing Node.canWriteDatastoreRequest to maxHTL - 1, and Node.canWriteDatastoreInsert to maxHTL - 2. - The impact is limited, because our peers route by our FOAFs, and since we’re most likely already close to their location. Best wishes, Arne -- Unpolitisch sein heißt politisch sein, ohne es zu merken. draketo.de
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