On Friday, 3 October 2014 at 20:31:42 UTC, Paolo Invernizzi wrote:
On Friday, 3 October 2014 at 18:00:58 UTC, Piotrek wrote:
On Friday, 3 October 2014 at 15:43:59 UTC, Sean Kelly wrote:
As one that has read the original report integrally, I think
that you have taken a bad example: despite the autopilot was
disengaged, the stall alarm ringed a pletora of times.
There's no real alternative to the disengagement of the
autopilot is that fundamental parameter is compromised.
It took the captain only a few moment to understand the problem
(read the voice-recording transcription), but it was too late...
For the curious, the flight analysis here:
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/crashes/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877
Captain's first error was to leave the cockpit when approaching
storm. Second, was to give command to the lower-experienced
co-pilots. Not only for quality of the flight, but also for the
quality of the team. His third error was to have neglected the
fact that the radar was not correctly set up. And his most
important (and final) error was to not take commands back while
coming back in to the cockpit.
And it was airliner's fault to embark on transatlantic flights
just one experienced man and two very low experienced copilots.
This is a beginner mistake:
"the insanity of pulling back on the controls while stalled"
and this passage resumes it quite well:
"the captain of the flight makes no attempt to physically take
control of the airplane. Had Dubois done so, he almost certainly
would have understood, as a pilot with many hours flying light
airplanes, the insanity of pulling back on the controls while
stalled"
If you read the analysis you get scared.
