On 4/2/2016 11:54 AM, Rich Pieri wrote: > On 4/1/2016 11:31 PM, Matthew Gillen wrote: >> The problem the FBI had even if they modified the OS themselves was >> signing it as an official update so that the phone would accept it... > > The terms of the GPLv3 prohibit the use of digital signatures to prevent > the execution of modified software. >
Well that depends on where and how you draw the line. They could have a bootloader that would allow you to put unsigned ROMs on the phone, but would erase everything, while still having a non-destructive update mechanism that requires a signed binary. They could argue that an unsigned binary voids warranty (as the GPLv3 allows), and their mechanism for knowing if someone broke the OS is that their non-destructive update requires signing. That would satisfy the anti-tivoization and be within the limits of the GPLv3, while still causing a problem for the FBI in this particular instance. Matt _______________________________________________ Discuss mailing list [email protected] http://lists.blu.org/mailman/listinfo/discuss
