Hi Ran

Given that it's still a W3C draft I am not sure it should be added to
Django core yet. I don't know of any official policy around what Django
implements versus the W3C spec levels though.

However it does seem that without a centralized solution for CSP nonces,
they won't be usable with third party apps as you found with
django-debug-toolbar.

For web security in Django, I'd like to help get strict-dynamic available
in a third party app, django-csp or otherwise. So I'm wondering, is your
code public? And do you think it is worth trying to merge into django-csp,
or would it be better as a standalone app? (I'm not really familiar with
what django-csp does/does not do)

Adam

On 13 May 2017 at 11:16, <ran...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hey,
>
> I'd like to discuss how Django might encourage and ease the use of CSP in
> the frontend. As Django is used more and more to drive complex web
> applications, I think this is of interest. (I tried to keep this short, but
> failed...).
>
> # CSP background
>
> CSP (Content Security Policy) is an elaborate mechanism which allows to
> attach a policy to a webpage, restricting the things it can do and the
> origins it can interact with. It is mainly meant to aid in the prevention
> of various code injection attacks. It is usually sent in the
> `Content-Security-Policy` header in the response to the HTML request.
> Please see here for more details: https://developer.mozilla.org/
> en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP
>
> Currently, in order to have a secure policy you must write big
> white-lists, which does not lend itself well to automation by a framework.
> For example, here is the policy GitHub sends, which is relatively tame as
> far as these go:
>
>     default-src 'none';
>     base-uri 'self';
>     child-src render.githubusercontent.com;
>     connect-src 'self' uploads.github.com status.github.com
> collector.githubapp.com api.github.com www.google-analytics.com
> github-cloud.s3.amazonaws.com github-production-repository-f
> ile-5c1aeb.s3.amazonaws.com github-production-user-asset-7
> 9cafe.s3.amazonaws.com wss://live.github.com;
>     font-src assets-cdn.github.com;
>     form-action 'self' github.com gist.github.com; frame-ancestors 'none';
>     img-src 'self' data: assets-cdn.github.com identicons.github.com
> collector.githubapp.com github-cloud.s3.amazonaws.com *.
> githubusercontent.com;
>     media-src 'none';
>     script-src assets-cdn.github.com;
>     style-src 'unsafe-inline' assets-cdn.github.com
>
> The django-csp project (https://github.com/mozilla/django-csp) helps with
> generating these in Django. However, maintaining, deploying and monitoring
> it is quite a major effort, depending on the complexity of the site.
>
> # The strict-dynamic directive
>
> Because of this, the upcoming version of the CSP standard (Level 3,
> https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/) includes a new `script-src` directive called
> `strict-dynamic`. It has its own website:
> https://csp.withgoogle.com/docs/index.html
>
> The idea here is that you send a policy like this:
>
>     script-src 'nonce-{random}' 'strict-dynamic';
>
> where `{random}` is some token that is randomly generated in each request,
> e.g. `hM6RAC4rgxYFk01gbbfcKw==`. Next, each script included in the page
> must be decorated with a `nonce` attribute, using the nonce sent in the
> header:
>
>     <script nonce="hM6RAC4rgxYFk01gbbfcKw=="
> src="/path/to/script.js"></script>
>
>     <script nonce="hM6RAC4rgxYFk01gbbfcKw==">foo()</script>
>
> What the `strict-dynamic` means, is that any script trusted with the nonce
> is transitively trusted to load its own scripts dynamically. Thus, most of
> the XSS protection remains, however the maintenance burden drops
> significantly, and it becomes much more amenable to automation in a
> framework.
>
> # Browser support and backward compatibility
>
> `strict-dynamic` is already supported in recent versions of Firefox and
> Chrome, and is "under consideration" by Edge:
> https://blogs.windows.com/msedgedev/2017/01/10/edge-csp-2/
>
> The CSP Level 3 spec is still a draft, but from what I could gather they
> are aiming to finalize it in "Q3 2017":
> https://rawgit.com/w3c/webappsec/master/admin/webappsec-charter-2017.html
>
> What about browsers which does not support `strict-dynamic`, but only
> support older CSP versions? With the policy I gave above, everything will
> be blocked (if nonces are not supported), or transitive scripts will be
> blocked (if nonces are supported). To workaround this, `strict-dynamic`
> has the behavior of disabling/ignoring other directives if it is
> understood. So we can send a policy like this instead:
>
>     script-src 'nonce-{random}' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'
> 'strict-dynamic' https: http:;
>
> In browsers that support CSP3, it will be interpreted as
>
>     script-src 'nonce-{random}' 'strict-dynamic' 'unsafe-eval'
>
> In browsers that support CSP2:
>
>     script-src 'nonce-{random}' 'unsafe-eval' https: http:;
>
> In browsers that support CSP1:
>
>     script-src 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https: http:;
>
> In all cases it should work out.
>
> Note however, that the following things cannot be used and must be
> replaced by modern equivalents:
>
> - `javascript:` URIs.
> - Inline event handlers, e.g. `onclick="foo()"`.
>
> For real-world usage, according to
> https://security.googleblog.com/2016/09/reshaping-web-defens
> es-with-strict.html
> Google are already using `strict-dynamic` in several of their
> applications, e.g. see the header sent by https://photos.google.com/.
>
> # Interaction with existing white-list based policies
>
> White-list based policies generated by e.g. django-csp are still useful,
> as they provide a different range of protections.
>
> It is possible to send multiple policies, in which case they are all
> enforced. Therefore, `strict-dynamic` can be treated as just an additive
> measure.
>
> Since Django does not support sending multiple headers with the same key,
> it is possible instead to ', '.join() them, as is standard in HTTP.
>
> # Integration with Django
>
> I wrote a Django app as a POC which adds such a policy automatically. It
> is very trivial and consists of:
>
> - A `csp_nonce` template tag, to be used like this:
>
>     <script {% csp_nonce %} src="{% static 'path/to/script.js'
> %}"></script>
>
>     <script {% csp_nonce %}>foo()</script>
>
> - A middleware which generates a fresh nonce on each request and injects
>   the header.
>
> This worked great in my testing with a complex web app, involving multiple
> 3rd party scripts (e.g. recaptcha, analytics, etc.). (I should note I did
> not deploy it, though).
>
> The only problem I encountered was with django-debug-toolbar, which
> injects its own javascript, but of course without the nonce. Hence, their
> JS is blocked. In this sense, it would be nice if this were integrated in
> Django's SecurityMiddleware, so that Django apps can add `{% csp_token %}`
> freely. And of course, be more visible to Django developers.
>
> Thanks,
> Ran
>
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-- 
Adam

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