Hi Zach,

To be clear, I'm not totally opposed to the change. There could certainly be advantages to updating the code, especially if we move to TimestampSigner.

However, from a quick look, I'm not sure if TimestampSigner will be possible - we want the hashed value to incorporate some internal data, but don't want that internal data to be part of the signed message that Signer produces (for various reasons, including the fact that we want to keep the URL as short as possible for maximum compatibility). I think we should also be careful not to change the public interface of PasswordResetTokenGenerator, since people may have subclassed it, which limits the amount of cleanup you can do here.

I imagine that changing the timestamp to support better precision will also create work for people upgrading (the setting change, plus URLconf changes).

What I am suggesting is that we should seriously consider whether all this is worth it given the extremely marginal security benefits.

Regards,

Luke


On 23/09/17 04:33, Zhiqiang Liu wrote:
Luke,

thanks for the long explanation. I see your points here. I actually saw the make token function and was thinking about it what is the best way to do with that. I think most people here feel there's need to at least allow some flexibility for the time out since there will be cases under a day is needed. I will keep this discussion for a couple of more days to see if we can get consensus and how we should implemented if needed.

Zach

On Friday, September 22, 2017 at 3:04:01 PM UTC-4, Luke Plant wrote:

    I would be +1 to what Adam wrote from me i.e. just allow the value
    to accept floats.

    However, I don't think it will work due to the way that we round
    the precision of timestamps to days
    
<https://github.com/django/django/blob/master/django/contrib/auth/tokens.py#L21>.
    This was done partly to reduce the number of characters needed to
    express the timestamp, to keep URLs as short as possible. We would
    have to change the mechanism to store more precision into the
    timestamp. This would result in an upgrade 'bump' for users (i.e.
    links generated before the upgrade would become invalid after
    upgrade).

    However, I really question whether we need any change here, and
    whether it would be a good idea.

    Having a short expiration time (less than 1 hour) could cause
    major problems for some people - plenty of systems introduce 5 or
    10 minute delays in mail delivery, and with some people's internet
    connection it can take several minutes to open a web page. This
    also means that some people end up finishing the process of
    whatever they were doing the next day (I know I've done this
    several times on various sites), so a timeout of at least 1 or 2
    days is a good default. If you want to come back after the weekend
    and carry on, 3 days makes more sense as a minimum.

    In terms of security, I don't think there is really any need for
    anyone to reduce below the default at all (see below). So I'm very
    unconvinced about the need for changing to PASSWORD_RESET_TIMEOUT
    - it is just unnecessary upgrade work for some existing projects
    (this is the biggest consideration for me), and it could encourage
    people to set the value to something low that would decrease
    usability.

    *Security:*

    The security of the password reset feature is almost entirely
    independent of the value of the timeout setting. There are 3
    attack vectors I can see:

    1) Someone's email account is compromised, and they then do a
    password reset on a Django site.

    We simply can't protect against this AFAICS.

    2) Someone's email account is compromised, and they find/use a
    password reset email in the person's inbox.

    This is the only scenario for which having a shorter timeout makes
    a difference. It is somewhat unlikely, because in 99% of cases the
    attacker would be able to generate a password reset email
    themselves after compromising the account. For this narrow case
    where the attacker is unwilling/unable to trigger/receive a new
    password reset email, it is worth having some protection against
    them being able to use old tokens, but 3 days seems plenty short
    enough for this situation, especially given the fact that a *used*
    password reset token immediately becomes invalid due to the way we
    hash on internal state of the user record.

    3) A brute force attack.

    To do this, the attacker has to:

    1. Supply a user ID (let's assume this is easy)

    2. ***Choose*** a timestamp (very easy, just choose the current time)

    3. Create a 20 character hexadecimal hmac that matches both the
    timestamp and the internal state of the user (see
    https://github.com/django/django/blob/master/django/contrib/auth/tokens.py
    <https://github.com/django/django/blob/master/django/contrib/auth/tokens.py>
    ).

    Since the attacker can choose the timestamp, the probability of
    guessing correctly depends **only** on:

    1. The number of bits in the hash (20*4 = 80)

    2. The number of attempts (or, the number of requests per second
    possible and the time available)

    It does **not** depend on the value of the reset timeout **at all**.

    If we assume they can make 100 req/s, and they try continuously
    for 10 years, they've got a chance of around 1 in 10^13.

    In other words, I reject the premise of the ticket, which is that
    to improve security some people need to reduce the timeout. It
    makes virtually no difference to the security of this feature, and
    in fact you would be protected against almost all realistic
    attacks if there was no timeout. I imagine that the requirement of
    "meeting security requirements" mentioned on the ticket is due to
    people who think this works like a short, 6 digit OTP, for which 3
    days would be far too long ( see
    https://sakurity.com/blog/2015/07/18/2fa.html
    <https://sakurity.com/blog/2015/07/18/2fa.html> ). We could put a
    note in the docs about this, I don't know how to do that in a
    succinct way apart from to link to a copy of this email or something.

    However, if we really do 'need' this change, we should at least
    keep the default to what it is now, and put a notice in the docs
    saying that reducing it hurts usability and makes no practical
    difference to security. Since we would be causing an upgrade bump
    and breaking existing links, we may as well also switch to
    TimestampSigner (the password reset code was originally written
    before that existed), which would also mean changing urlconfs I
    imagine. This would also require a significant section in the
    upgrade notes. (In my book, this is a further argument against
    doing this change at all).


    Regards,

    Luke
    On 21/09/17 12:25, Adam Johnson wrote:
    Why not just keep PASSWORD_RESET_TIMEOUT_DAYSand allow floats?
    Then you can just do 1/24 for an hour.

    On 21 September 2017 at 09:50, Eddy C <coupo...@chicheng.me
    <javascript:>> wrote:

        I think Minute, with default value 30 or 60, is the best unit
        for this setting.

        3 minutes (even 1) is short enough for edge case and 720 (12
        hours) also looks good.

        On Thursday, September 21, 2017 at 6:22:20 PM UTC+10, Tom
        Forbes wrote:

            I think we shouldn't shoe-horn a timedelta into the
            existing setting, so my vote is with the second option,
            but I think a timedelta is much more readable than just
            an integer.

            Also, the existing 3 day timeout for password links is
            quite surprising from a security point of view. The
            consultants I work with would flag up a token that lasts
            longer than 12 hours as an issue during a pentest.

            IMO a new, far shorter default should be added to this
            setting.

            On 21 Sep 2017 03:56, "Zhiqiang Liu" <zachl...@gmail.com>
            wrote:

                I need general consensus on how to proceed with
                supporting password expire time to be under a day.
                Currently it is not possible because we use
                PASSWORD_RESET_TIMEOUT_DAYS.

                In ticket 28622
                <https://code.djangoproject.com/ticket/28622> we have
                two options.

                One is to continue to use the same setting
                PASSWORD_RESET_TIMEOUT_DAYS, but change the value to
                non-integer (such as timedelta) so we can send hours,
                minutes, etc to it.

                The other one is to create a new setting like
                PASSWORD_RESET_TIMEOUT which takes seconds.To support
                backward compatibility, I think we should keep
                PASSWORD_RESET_TIMEOUT_DAYS and its default value of
                3. Only use PASSWORD_RESET_TIMEOUT when provided.

                I'm unsure which one is better, so inputs are welcome.
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