Forwarding alone shouldn't be blowing up messages. If you're doing
something to the message content that invalidates the DKIM signature
or causes the the from address and return path to not be aligned,
that's where you're going to run into problems. If you don't modify
the message in any way while forwarding it on, you shouldn't run
into issues due to DMARC.


The above first sentence is a widely held view, using typical language.

However the sentence is wrong in so many different technical and operations ways and levels, that it mostly services as an example of the problem in talking about email. At base, it relies on a simplistic model that produces Procrustean assertions. At base, it's just wrong.

Mailing lists take delivery of a message and posts a new one. Most mailing lists get their utility by facilitating communication between original authors and final recipients. Mailing lists vary in the value add they provide in this process; it often includes modifying the original message in a variety of entirely legal -- and often useful -- ways.

Again, what they do is legal and useful, and has been for 30 years.

Any assertion or implication that a mailing list, which re-posts a legitimately and usefully modified message, is somehow doing something wrong, is itself the problem.

The mailing list is not the problem. The problem is over-application of mechanisms or policies that render legitimate email non-functional.

There are serious email abuses motivating the over-application. They shouldn't be ignored. However, the fact of those abuses are serving to create new ones. Calling the new problems are abuses sounds impolitic, but how else should breaking long-standing, independent, legitimate email service be characterized?

It's entirely possible that the work-arounds being pursued, with new modifications to rfc5322.From and rfc5322.Reply-To will suffice. But they carry their own downsides.

On the average, a hack to remedy a hack damages the system and often requires more hacks.

Architectures usually layer nicely.  Hacks rarely do.

d/

--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net
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