Bumping this, too. All items below are still open.

On Fri, Oct 6, 2017 at 8:27 PM, Seth Blank <s...@sethblank.com> wrote:

> Questions 1, 2, and 4 as they relate to the text I suggested are still
> open - and I don't believe the text that was pulled into -09 is correct
> until these questions are answered.
>
> On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 5:52 PM, Seth Blank <s...@sethblank.com> wrote:
>
>> There have been substantial comments both on and off list about section
>> 5.1.1. I've suggested new language for all of 5.1, below, to remove
>> normative modification of 7601, and address several other issues. There are
>> questions for the WG below the suggested text.
>>
>> ===============
>>
>> Replace 5.1 with:
>>
>> The ARC-Authentication-Results (AAR) header field is semantically and
>> syntactically identical to the Authentication-Results header defined in
>> [RFC7601#2.2] as authres-header (A-R), except that the first element
>> “Authentication-Results:” in authres-header is replaced with
>> arc-authres-prefix as follows:
>>
>>    arc-authres-header-prefix = "ARC-Authentication-Results:" [CFWS]
>> arc-info
>>
>>     arc-info = %x69 “=” arc-hop *([CFWS] “;” [CFWS] propspec) [CFWS] “;”
>>
>>     arc-hop = 1*2DIGIT  ; 1-50
>>
>> The purpose of this header field is to transmit the results of any
>> authentication done on the message upstream to participating ADMDs
>> validating and continuing the chain.
>>
>> The AAR MUST contain all A-R results from within the participating ADMD,
>> regardless of how many A-R headers are on the message.
>>
>> ===============
>>
>> Replace 5.1.1 with:
>>
>> 5.1.1. ptypes and properties for arc-info
>>
>> Certain information pertinent to ascertaining message disposition can be
>> lost in transit when messages are handled by intermediaries. For example,
>> failing DKIM signatures are sometimes removed by MTAs, and most DKIM
>> signature on messages modified by intermediaries will fail. Therefore, a
>> passing DKIM-Signature from the first ARC signer is likely to have been
>> removed by final receipt of the message.
>>
>> The AAR, and in particular the ptype-properties stamped in arc-info,
>> provide a mechanism for this information to survive transit.
>>
>> The ptypes and properties defined in this section SHOULD be stamped in
>> the AAR:
>>
>> * smtp.client_id - The connecting client IP address from which the
>> message is received;
>> * header.ds - The domain/selector pair for each dkim signature on the
>> message (header.ds=example.com,selector)
>> * arc.closest_fail - The hop number of the most recent AMS that fails to
>> validate, or 0 if all hops pass.
>>
>> ===============
>>
>> Open questions:
>>
>> 1) The optimal ABNF for AAR would inherit the A-R payload ABNF from 7601.
>> Unfortunately, authres-header was defined in a way that makes this
>> difficult. Is there a better way to say that the AAR inherits the A-R
>> payload, and if anything modifies the definition of authres-header in 7601,
>> the AAR also needs to inherit this change?
>>
>> To be super specific, this is the current authres-header ABNF from 7601:
>>
>>      authres-header = "Authentication-Results:" [CFWS] authserv-id
>>               [ CFWS authres-version ]
>>               ( no-result / 1*resinfo ) [CFWS] CRLF
>>
>> Optimally, there would be:
>>
>>      authres-payload = [CFWS] authserv-id
>>               [ CFWS authres-version ]
>>               ( no-result / 1*resinfo ) [CFWS] CRLF
>>
>> And then we could have:
>>
>>    arc-authres-header = "ARC-Authentication-Results:" [CFWS] arc-info
>> authres-payload
>>
>> 2) The optimal way to transmit DKIM selector information is in the DKIM
>> A-R methodspec as header.s. If we want to prevent a normative modification
>> of 7601, I've proposed "header.ds" which will accomplish the same thing.
>>
>> 3) In the ARC-Seal megathread, there was an aside about knowing the last
>> hop which validated:
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Bron Gondwana <br...@fastmailteam.com>
>> wrote:
>> > That seems like it would be enough to fix that objection.  An
>> additional "first AMS failure" header at each hop would give you a list of
>> who actually modified the message.
>>
>> arc.closest_fail has been defined to accomplish this.
>>
>> 4) Have the ptype-properties been defined properly, and will these AAR
>> ptype-properties need an IANA registry?
>>
>> 5) Finally, the ams[n] and as[n] entities were dropped, as these values
>> are guaranteed to be on the final message if an ARC chain passes, so
>> there's no need to encode them separately.
>>
>> Seth
>>
>
>
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