Hi,

On 1/26/2018 3:23 PM, Brandon Long wrote:
I sometimes override DMARC p=quarantine failures with filters, does
DMARC require a filters extended tag and compliance by mail clients to
not allow overriding of the filters if the domain requests it?

Local Policy always prevails. But we all work towards developing a common protocol and hopefully, and ideally, do so on a cooperative competitive basis where all nodes are treated the same at the protocol level. The add-on value may be what the implementation may offer at the local level to customers, i.e. features, options, etc.

I believe the intent of the domain is his published policy record. If a restrictive policy is published, the receiver should not presume it did not mean it. When failure is detected, the author domain with a restrictive policy is given the world permission to treated it harshly.

    See RFC5016, "Requirements for a DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
    Signing Practices Protocol."  Also note section 5.3 Item 10
    which basically reminds us about Local Policy expectations.

But to me, thats just a protocol option:

    How should DMARC failures be handled?

    (o) Reject with _55x_ SMTP rejection code
    (_) Quarantine to user's spam box.
    [X] NEW! Check for the DMARC arc= tag.

etc.

I will have something like that in my implementation and even more options as we learn more how ARC is suppose to operate and fit in with the rest of the DKIM/POLICY/TRUST architectural model and system. Others may automatically presumed everything is accepted (250 reply code) and put into the user's spam box where it can be eyeballed by them (or completely forgotten by them). Some here strongly believe that is the only to operate (never reject). I believe in options.

My point is, fundamentally in the mail eco-system, whether something
is delivered or rejected or labeled as spam is at the discretion of
the receiver.  Having increasing levels of "but I really mean it" for
DMARC is not useful.

yes, thats a given, always, Local Policy always prevails.

But that is exactly why the extended policy signal would offer a more explicit indication of the the domain's intent. With no tag, there is an element of "fuzziness" for the receiver on whether it is doing the right thing.

If the domain has arc=0, then the compliant ARC/DMARC receiver SHOULD honor the intent of the protocol when the policy is restrictive. If the domain has arc != 0, then the compliant ARC/DMARC receiver CAN|MAY use ARC to preempt a restrictive policy DMARC failure.

There is no ambiguity now, both technically and legally, if I may add, presuming that there may be DMARC domains who do not want any ARC processing of failed mail, using ARC to bypass a True Positive failure may have some level of liability concerns. i.e. you can't ignore this consideration.

Also, the sender doesn't implement ARC, so why should they care?

Because of the point above.  Its always better to be protocol specific.

Also consider the ARC-ignorant receiver (who just doesn't know anything about it) but it supports DMARC, it may honor restrictive policies. That would be the DMARC protocol expectation. It would behave with an default 'arc=0" policy when it reads a DMARC record because it knows nothing about it.


Also, I think some of this already happens today based on reports.  We
get complaints about where we override DMARC from domains all the
time, and that goes into our work on making our overrides more
correct.  I don't see how arc=n helps that at all.

There will be domains who will not want to participate in a concept that can bypass true positive DMARC failures -- it can be viewed as security loophole.

Having an indicator will definitely help receivers with their processing logic, including development and usage of APIs. Without it, ARC will add a new element of DMARC processing fuzziness unless you are presuming that any receiver even contemplating ARC implies that the receiver is automatically going to ignore author domain wishes. Be careful with that because that would be enough for some implementators and domains to nix the whole ARC idea.

If you wanted to
help that, you'd want some mechanism or automation with which a domain
owner could tell a particular mailbox provider that they're doing a
bad job, and that's a lot more complicated than arc=n.

Yes I would think that would be more complex, but also a different idea. Receivers are already doing a DMARC lookup. Adding an extended tag like "arc=" will assist receivers in how to process failures without ambiguity.

To me, the only real protocol design question would be what ARC would recommend as the default "arc=" value. Using "arc=1" as the default would presume ARC can bypass any DMARC failure without explicit permission from the Author Domain. The burden would be on the current DMARC p=reject/quarantine policies domains to add an "arc=0" to tell receivers "Please don't skip failures by using ARC."


Thanks

--
HLS


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