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In message <[email protected]>, John Levine
<[email protected]> writes

>It appears that Richard Clayton  <[email protected]> said:
>>You will need to say EHLO with a domain name that aligns with the From:
>>if you cannot manage that then DKIM is your only way to get your bounce
>>message to have a DMARC pass
>
>Now that I look at it, RFC 7489 says ambiguously in section 3.1.2 that
>the HELO can be used to "fake" (quotes in the original) a domain for
>alignment, while the current draft says in sec 4.4.2 "DMARC relies
>solely on SPF validation of the MAIL FROM identity."

the current text is better and far more precise (though it does rely on
the way in which RFC7208 is written)

>I don't remember the origin of this change.  I don't feel strongly
>either way whether to use the HELO but I would like to be sure
>it's deliberate.

It is NOT "using the HELO identity" it is using the "MAIL FROM identity"
which is specially defined to be something other than what is in the
5321 MAIL command for the special case when it would otherwise be null

>What do existing DMARC libraries do?

for OpenDMARC, so far as I can see, the right thing

   ret = opendmarc_spf2_find_mailfrom_domain(ctx, mail_from_domain,
                      mfrom, sizeof mfrom, used_mfrom);
   if (ret != 0 || *used_mfrom == FALSE)
   {
      (void) strlcpy(helo, helo_domain, sizeof helo);
      SPF_request_set_helo_dom(ctx->spf_request, helo);
   }

Now one might observe that a bad person might proceed as follows

        HELO financialcompany.com
        MAIL FROM: <>
        RCPT TO: <[email protected]>
        DATA
        From: [email protected]
        Subject: click me

        http://verybad.example2.com
        .
        QUIT

but that would just serves the financial company right for providing an
SPF record in the first place (or not adding the syntax to say "heres an
SPF record but ignore it")

- -- 
richard                                                  Richard Clayton

Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a        Benjamin
little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.    Franklin

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